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Abstract 
  
EMERGING COLD WAR IDEOLOGIES DURING THE POPULIST ERA IN  
LATIN AMERICA AND THE US MEDIA RESPONSE  
Katherine Prince  
  
Thesis Chair: Colin Snider, Ph.D. The 
University of Texas at Tyler   
July 2017  
  
This thesis aims to identify the characteristics of populism and how those characteristics 
directly affected the politics and helped set the stage for later military dictatorships in 
Latin America.  This text aims to look at how military regimes in Latin America placed 
blame on populist leaders and used their inefficiencies as a justification for taking power 
and establishing military rule.  In many instances in Latin America, populist leader’s time 
in office was characterized by inflation and concern over foreign investment. 
            The concern over foreign investment and possible foreign takeover of local 
industries provides the background for another concern, that of outside (mainly 
communist) influence being introduced into the country. One question this paper looks at 
is why the Cuban Revolution is seen as the turning point for communism in Latin 
America when there were anti-communist policies during the Populist era. 
 This paper attempts to look at how the Cuban Revolution was seen as the turning point 
for Latin American countries in their fight against communists.  This paper looks at how 
iii 
 
the US media responded to populist leaders anti-communist statements and how pre-Cold 
War ideologies are found in populist era rhetoric. 
 This paper hopes to bridge the threat of communism from the so called populist era, to 
the Cuban Revolution, and through into the military dictatorships.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
The Cold War and the perceived threats of Communism are traditionally viewed 
from the standpoint of how United States and Soviet Union relations created tension; 
however, the Cold War affected other areas around the world, even while anticommunism 
predated the Cold War throughout the Americas. The United States was concerned that 
communism would fill the political void left by fascism at the end of World War II. The 
US saw communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as a threat to democracy if it 
were to spread. Be it in the Red Scare following World War I or the Cold world period, 
the US wanted to avoid the spread of Communism to the Western hemisphere at all costs. 
Yet the US was not isolated in these goals. The threat of communism was an important 
issue in Latin America both before and during the Cold War. Classical populist leaders in 
Latin America like Juan Perón and Getulio Vargas were concerned with communism 
spreading to their countries.  
In the decades preceding the Cold War, during the 1930s and 1940s, many 
countries in Latin America had populist leaders as presidents. These leaders, like Juan 
Perón and Getulio Vargas, focused on ending the traditional oligarchy’s monopoly on 
power and wanted to provide more rights for all members of society. Both Vargas and 
Perón sought to make the distribution of wealth more equal between all members of 
society. Not everyone agreed with these ideas, but the majority of people, especially the 
working class, supported them. Perón and Vargas also wanted to enact social reforms that 
would provide the lower classes with access to medical care, higher wages, and better 
living conditions while extending their political voice.   
Scholarship on communism in Latin America tends to focus on the Cuban  
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Revolution and its effects or the fight against communism by later military dictatorships. 
Scholars do not ignore that populist leaders talked about or dealt with communism; 
however, they tend to mention communism as if it were a small nuisance that showed up 
to distract people from the more important issues. Scholarship does not go into much 
detail about how populist leaders deal with communism. The years immediately 
following Perón and Vargas tend to overlook any mention of communism by the two.  
This work aims to look at the policies and legislation made my populist leaders 
and how it was viewed by detractors, most notably in US media, as being communistic in 
what the leaders were trying to achieve. This thesis also aims to look at what measures, if 
any; populist leaders took in order to stop the threat of communism. I argue that the age 
of Populism in Brazil and Argentina predate and overlapped with emerging Cold War 
ideologies. I also look at how foreign policy with the United States affected populist 
leaders and how the United States responded to the populists’ policies through the US 
media during their time in office. The US media saw anybody who suggested social 
reforms as “communist” despite the quite clear evidence that neither Juan Perón nor 
Getulio Vargas were remotely sympathetic to communism. It is important to note that the 
suggested use of social reforms as a way to combat communism was the same approach 
that was taken by the US and Europe.   
Much of the work that focuses on anticommunism in Latin America hinges on the 
military dictatorships of the 1960s. I argue that the age of Populism in Brazil and 
Argentina predated and overlapped with emerging Cold War ideologies. This research 
aims to look at how populist leaders in the 1930s and 1940s dealt with communism and 
how the US media portrayed the populists and their policies regarding communism. This 
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research is important because it reveals that the Cuban Revolution, which is usually seen 
as the starting point of communism in Latin America, was not the first instance of 
communism or anticommunism in Latin America. This research explores how 
communism was seen as a threat in Latin America before the start of the Cold War.   
Chapter one of this text begins by situating the Populist Era and the Cold War era 
in history. It examines how these two time periods are often seen as taking place one right 
after the other. However, this chapter explores how the two eras oftentimes overlap, 
especially in the area of Cold War rhetoric. This chapter also explores the different 
definitions of what populism is and how it is defined by different scholars. The 
difficulties that populist leaders dealt with during the 1930s through the 1940s, such as 
the Great Depression and the issues regarding diplomatic relations with the United States, 
are discussed next. Lastly, this chapter explores the brief histories of the Communist 
Parties in both Argentina and Brazil, which leads to how anti-communism was presented 
in the immediate post-World War II context in the US.    
Chapter two turns to Argentina, the first case study, exploring politics during the 
years before Perón gained political power and how problems with the political system of 
the 1920s and 1930s provided a niche for Perón to fill. This chapter then moves on to 
explore Perón’s beginnings in politics and what problems he wanted to correct in 
Argentina. It describes how the US and Argentina attempted to build a mutually 
beneficial relationship with each other. Finally this chapter explores US media reactions 
to Perón’s suggested plans at stopping communism in Argentina.   
Chapter three turns to the Brazilian case. It starts with the history of Brazil’s First 
Republic and how the use of the patronage system created large divisions between the 
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social classes. Next the fall of the First Republic is explored and how its end provided 
Vargas with the opportunity to gain power in politics. Vargas’s political beginnings are 
then explored to situate what his ideas were for modernizing Brazil. Next Vargas’s 
policies towards communism during the Estado Novo are explored through the use of 
New York Times articles. Lastly, Vargas’s politics on communism are explored during the 
beginnings of the Cold War until his suicide in 1954.   
The largest source of information used within this thesis comes from articles 
printed in the New York Times. The New York Times is illustrative of the overwhelming 
influence the United States had in hemispheric politics. These articles provided 
information on how populists, in their own words, explicitly described their policies 
towards communism, even as they implicitly illuminate how the US media interpreted or 
misinterpreted what the populists had outlined. Using the newspaper articles, I outline the 
emergence of Cold War rhetoric in Latin America and the response in US media, how 
this rhetoric changed in both Latin American and US media, and how attitudes towards 
populist leaders changed throughout the 1930s and 1940s. Using the New York Times as 
my main primary source, I argue that the US media reported on Perón and Vargas 
frequently and in interesting ways established its anticommunist discourses before and 
during the early Cold War. This paper reveals that emerging Cold War ideologies did not 
begin at the start of the Cold War, but instead in the 1930s.   
The secondary sources used within this work provided the background 
information on what was taking place politically in Argentina and Brazil during these 
years. The secondary sources also helped explain the changes taking place inside the 
Communist Parties in Latin America at the time. The most beneficial text to this work 
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was Latin America Between the Second World War and the Cold War, 1944-1948. In 
their introductory chapter, Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxbourough outline the diplomatic 
relations between the US, Argentina, and Brazil, and how these relations influenced 
policies in the two Latin American countries. Bethell and Roxbourough effectively set the 
scene for how the relationships change with the introduction of a more politically active 
Communist Party in Argentina and Brazil. The text is broken into sections that each 
concentrate on a different country during this time period. Bethell pens the section on 
Brazil and is successful in thoroughly explaining the goals of both Vargas and the 
Communists. Bethell takes the time to briefly explain the origins of the communist party 
in Brazil and its relationship with Luis Carlos Prestes. Over all Bethell’s section on Brazil 
provided a succinct explanation of politics and communism in Brazil during the pre-Cold 
War era. In this same text, Michael Rapoport pens the section on Argentina. Rapoport 
attempts to delve into the complicated narrative of Argentinean politics from 1916 
through the late 1930s. Rapoport does mention the major points of this period, the 
elections of Yrigoyen and the infamous decade, but does not really bridge the narrative 
between the two. The same issue arose throughout the rest of the section as Rapoport 
begins to explore the Argentine Communist Party’s politics and the rise of Perón. Both  
Bethell’s and Rapoport’s sections provided this work with extensive information on the 
workings of the Communist Parties in each country and how their politics did or did not  
fit into the politics of each populist leader.    
Michael Conniff’s Populism in Latin America, is a collection of essays that 
explore populism throughout Latin America. Conniff’s text compiles information on 
widely known populists, such as Perón and Vargas, and explores why each are considered 
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populists. Conniff argues that Vargas is a populist because of his political appeal towards 
workers, making this a classic component of populism. Conniff argues that Vargas’s 
attempts to influence and gain the support of the working class was the backbone of 
Vargas’s political platform. This is an important observation for this work, because 
Vargas had a close relationship with workers, as did the Communist Party of  
Brazil. Conniff also provided important information for this project with his article “The 
Tenentes in Power: A New Perspective on the Brazilian Revolution of 1930.” Conniff 
argues that the tenente movement was a prominent movement in the creation of modern 
Brazil, because it set a precedent for disenfranchised groups of people to agitate for the 
changes they wanted. Conniff’s text, in conjunction with his book provided this project 
with a look at how Brazilian politics changed from the traditional oligarchy into the 
Brazil of Vargas. While both of Conniff’s works were focused on Vargas’s early politics, 
the two works could have mentioned, at least in passing, what role the communists 
played in Brazilian politics.  
Thomas Skidmore’s Politics in Brazil 1930-1964: An Experiment in Democracy 
provided extensive information on politics in Brazil from the 1920s through the 1950s. 
Skidmore argues that the unrest in São Paulo and the demands for a more inclusive 
political system led to the military coup that brought Vargas to power. Skidmore provides 
extensive details on how actions of previous political leaders influenced Vargas to create 
his political platform. Skidmore argues that breaking apart the traditional patronage 
system allowed for a place in politics for the working class, where Vargas found his 
largest support. Skidmore’s book is one of only a few secondary sources on Brazil that 
provide a small amount of detail on why populist leaders were blamed for allowing 
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communism to infiltrate the country. Skidmore contends that Vargas’s and later 
populist’s desire to be more inclusive as to who had voting rights led some to see 
populism as fitting into communist ideology.   
Skidmore’s text was also beneficial to this work because of his outlining how the 
Communist Party of Brazil interacted with the Vargas government. Skidmore did not 
treat the communists as a secondary story that happened outside of Vargas’s time, but 
instead traced how the two sometimes had overlapping ideas on what was best for Brazil. 
Skidmore’s text provided the information necessary to create an outline of Brazil’s 
political history from the 1920s-1950s. Skidmore’s work condensed political 
maneuverings and changes into an easily understandable text. One area in which 
Skidmore’s text is lacking is his description of politics immediately following Vargas’s 
suicide. While Skidmore does an adequate job of condensing and thoroughly explaining 
the confusing time period of constantly changing presidents, he leaves Vargas out of the 
discussion. Vargas’s suicide had far reaching effects on the politics of Brazil, especially 
in the immediate years after. After Vargas’ suicide, the US media and his detractors in 
Brazil, paint Vargas as sympathetic towards Communism. Skidmore tends to quickly 
leave Vargas and his legacy behind to focus on the new presidents to come. Skidmore 
also leaves room for the study of US-Brazil relations in the Vargas Era.   
Ernest A. Duff’s article “Luis Carlos Prestes and the Revolution of 1924” is 
another useful text in understanding the lead up to Brazilian populism. Duff’s article 
outlines the leader of the Brazilian Communist Party’s life and involvement in political 
issues beginning in the 1920s. Duff contends that Prestes was an important figure in 
politics from the 1920s and 1930s whose absence in scholarship should be rectified. Duff 
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argues that Prestes’s actions leading the Prestes Column began his importance in 
expressing his displeasure with politics in Brazil. Duff’s article provided an accessible 
background of Prestes’s life, but did not get lost in recounting amusing anecdotes about 
Prestes that other works tend to focus on. Duff explains in detail the politics of the time 
that moved Prestes to create the Prestes column. These details explore what issues were 
important to Prestes and how they influenced him into becoming a part of the Communist 
Party of Brazil. While Duff’s work creates a foundation for why Prestes is important to 
Brazilian history and how his early politics affected his later political life, Duff’s article 
ends after the Prestes Column has ended. Duff does not go into detail about how he 
became the leader of the Communist Party in Brazil. Duff’s main argument is that history 
often overlooks Prestes, but Duff himself does the same thing. Prestes’s involvement in 
the Communist Party and his dislike for Vargas and his ideals are an important part of 
Brazilian history. Prestes’ position as leader of the Communist Part of Brazil revealed 
how the Communist Party as a whole viewed Vargas and his policies.   
   Lastly on the topic of the transition to Vargas is the article “The Brazilian 
Revolution of 1930, Causes and Aftermath,” by James M. Daniel. This article explores 
the issues that laid the groundwork for Vargas’s political platform and the actions that 
ultimately led to his coming to power. Daniel argues that there were two causes for why 
the coup of 1930 happened: the depression of 1929 and a desire among certain peoples to 
expand who was considered a part of society. Daniel illuminates how choosing who 
would ascend to the presidency traditionally alternated between two states. Beginning in 
the late 1920s, there was unrest with this traditional way of choosing the president, and in 
conjunction with the uncertainty brought on by the depression, it fueled political 
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discontent as well the demand a new way of choosing a president. This led to the coup 
that installed Vargas as president. The strength of this article for this work is that Daniel 
briefly mentions that Vargas outlined the reasons the coup had to happen in a letter to the  
New York Times. This revealed that Vargas had early correspondence with the US media. 
While Daniel does explore what Vargas’s early plans were for his presidency, he does not 
go into much detail about the aftermath his article claimed to address.   
  Mark A. Healey’s book The Ruins of The New Argentina: Peronism and 
the Remaking of San Juan after the 1944 Earthquake, explores the rise of Juan Perón in 
Argentine politics. Healey argues that the 1944 earthquake in San Juan provided a 
platform for Perón to use to start his political career, using the aftermath of the 
earthquake, to practice and fine tune his populist rhetoric by putting together committees 
to help those affected. Perón’s constant calls for government aide for earthquake victims 
made him stand apart from other government officials Healey argues. Healey’s text traces 
Perón’s early rhetoric of wanting to help those in the lower classes in Argentina during 
his early political career providing an example of how Perón adapted his rhetoric over the 
years, without faltering in supporting the working class by enacting social reforms.  
Healey’s book provides a look into Perón’s political rhetoric with only minor mentions of 
his wife, Eva. Unlike other texts, Healey does not focus largely on what both Perón and his 
wife tried to accomplish, but instead what Perón himself tried to accomplish.   
Daniel J. Greenberg’s article, “From Confrontation to Alliance: Peronist 
Argentina's Diplomacy with the United States, 1945-1951,” positions US and Argentine 
relations with the Peronist era in Argentina. Greenberg argues that Argentina and Perón 
were viewed as allies of the Axis Powers, which created distrust between the US and 
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Argentina. Greenberg goes on to argue that while Perón was an economic nationalist, he 
would eventually give in to some US demands which helped reestablish a trusting 
relationship. This budding trust helped with the creation of an anticommunist alliance 
between the two countries. Greenberg’s argument of an anticommunist relationship 
between the two countries reveals how early scholarship overlooked an important source 
on this time period. The New York Times articles used in this work reveal that in the US 
media, at least, there were questions of whether Perón’s anticommunist policies would 
really work.   
  Lastly on the topic of Argentina there is Luis Alberto Romero’s book The 
History of Argentina in the Twentieth Century. Romero’s book breaks down the twentieth 
century in Argentina into easily identifiable sections that explore an important change in 
Argentina’s history. Romero’s text, while covering the whole twentieth century, focuses 
largely on Perón and his policies. Romero reveals how Perón created a political 
movement around his personality and implemented many beneficial social reforms. 
Romero explores how these social reforms were aimed at the working and lower classes 
in order to elevate their status inside of society. Romero’s in depth look at Perón’s social 
reforms reveal what Perón’s plans were for combating communism. In conjunction with 
the New York Times articles, Romero’s text helps outline Perón’s plans for using social 
reforms to combat communism.   
This thesis is important to overall scholarship on the populist era and its emerging 
Cold War ideologies because what has already been written tends to gloss over the 
relationship between populism and Cold War anticommunism. The aforementioned 
works do not completely leave out that communism was at least a minor problem around 
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the 1930s and 1940s; however there are many gaps in scholarship on how later 
communist policies were influenced by populist leader’s own anticommunist policies or 
how those policies fit within broader hemispheric anticommunism. This work aims to 
look at the policies and legislation made by populist leaders and how US media outlets 
reported on them as being communistic in what the leaders were trying to achieve. This 
work also aims to look at what measures, if any, populist leaders took in order to stop the 
threat of communism. With the use of secondary sources, this work traces how populist 
leaders’ attempts to stop the spread of communism in Latin America were questioned by 
the US media. I argue that the age of Populism in Brazil and Argentina predated and 
overlapped with emerging Cold War ideologies.   
The secondary sources, mainly Thomas Skidmore’s and Ernest Duff’s texts, 
situate how fighting communism was an important issue during the Populist Era. I also 
look at how foreign policy with the United States affected populist leaders and how the 
United States responded to the populists’ policies through the US media during their time 
in office. James M. Daniel’s article provides an example of how Vargas was in direct 
contact with the New York Times in order to explain his actions. Secondary sources on 
Perón do not reveal that he had any contact with the New York Times. By exploring 
populist leaders’ anticommunist ideologies as reported in US newspapers, this thesis 
works towards providing an understanding that anticommunist rhetoric in Latin America 
did not begin with the Cuban Revolution.   
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Chapter 2: Populism and Pre-Cold War Era  
  One year after being forced from office after a fifteen year 
presidency/dictatorship, Getulio Vargas pledged, “Democracy of the workers, to that I 
belong. For this I will fight on behalf of the people,”1 is an example of classic populist 
rhetoric. Populism was on the rise during the 1930s through the early 1940s in Latin 
America. Populists wanted to change politics from traditional oligarchy to a more 
inclusive system. The Great Depression hindered many of the polices earlier political 
leaders attempted during this time. Populism offered an alternative to fascism and 
communism. Populism does not fit neatly within any particular ideology, even as it often 
can and has overlapped with ideologies as diverse as fascism and communism.   
The Cold War is defined as taking place roughly from the late 1940s to the 1980s, 
although there is some debate that the start of the Cold War began with the speech that 
ultimately created the Truman Doctrine (1947-1948.2  The main focus of Cold War 
studies explores the conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union; however, 
the Cold War, and the ideological struggles at its core, played out in countries throughout 
the world.  The Cold War is the time after the end of World War II when there were no 
major global conflicts taking place. While the dates of the Cold War are fluid, one can see 
the beginnings of communist scares taking place even before the beginning of World War 
II.  The perceived threat of communism affected Latin American countries just as much, 
if not more than, other areas of the world.  During the period leading up to, during, and 
                                                 
1 News/Opinion, “Getulio Vargas Hits Brazil Government,” The Dallas Morning News, December 
1, 1946.  
2 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Latin America, the United States, and the World (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), 135.  
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after World War II many Latin American countries had populist leaders. While the 
Populist Era and the Cold War are often discussed as separate time periods in Latin  
America and the United States, they overlap considerably. In the cases of Argentina and 
Brazil (notably the first Vargas era, 1930-1945), this thesis argues Populist Era policies 
and discourse and what scholars have come to identify as Cold War policies blended 
together.   
Populism in Latin America  
   As the Latin American historical case makes clear, the definitions of 
populism can be convoluted, broad, and contested. By and large, most scholars place the 
classic Populist period in the region in the 1920s-1940s. Populism grew in response to the 
dissatisfaction of the lower and working classes with the traditional oligarchies. Landed 
elites were in charge and had the most influence over politics. Populism offered the 
working class, who would become its largest political support system, inclusion in 
politics. Including previously disenfranchised sectors of society and being able to raise 
those people’s standard of living were what populists wanted to achieve. Populists 
suggested reforms that would help elevate many people in their respective countries out 
of poverty; however, the Great Depression sometimes hindered those plans.   
What most scholars can agree on is that populism is a political style that is often 
characterized by often disputed, characteristics centered on a highly visible leader.    
The most functional way to define populism is that it is a political style.3Alan  
                                                 
3 Alan Knight, “Populism and Neo-Populism in Latin America, Especialy Mexico,” Journal of 
Latin American Studies 30 (2).   
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Knight argues that by defining populism as political style, scholars can look at the way a 
person governs but at the personality of those who are in power.4 Knight contends that 
exploring populism this way allows scholars to see the larger picture before breaking 
each populist leader down on an individual basis while allowing greater variety among 
populists in Latin America. Knight’s definition provides a broad basis for analysis which 
allows for populist leaders to assert more individuality.    
Other scholars have pushed the search for the defining characteristics of populism 
even further. Kenneth Roberts outlines certain guidelines for considering what makes a 
populist leader and has categorized what he calls the “five core properties” of populism: a 
personalistic and paternalistic, though not necessarily charismatic, pattern of political 
leadership, a heterogeneous, multi-class political coalition concentrated in subaltern 
sectors of society, a top-down process of political mobilization that either bypasses 
institutionalized forms of mediation or subordinates them to more direct linkages between 
the leader and the masses, an amorphous or eclectic ideology, characterized by a 
discourse that exalts subaltern sectors or is anti-elitist and/or anti-establishment, and an 
economic project that uses widespread redistributive or clientelistic methods to create a 
material foundation for popular-sector support.5 Roberts’ definition of populism provides 
scholars with a framework for closely analyzing populist leaders themselves, in addition 
to the political style as a whole. Roberts’s five core properties accentuate a small amount 
of what could be considered populist characteristics. While Roberts’s definition allows 
well-known populists such as Getúlio Vargas and Juan Perón to fit neatly into its 
                                                 
4 Alan Knight, “Populism and Neo-Populism.”  
5 Karen Kampwirth, ed.,  Gender and Populism in Latin America: Passionate Politics, (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press,  2010)  2.  
15 
 
parameters, while it excludes other persons classified as populist, such as Rafael Trujillo 
of the Dominican Republic. Roberts’ properties also leave out a notable component of 
most populist leaders’ time in power; the repression and garnering of dictatorial powers.   
Francisco Panizza argues that populism “blurs the public-private dividing line and 
brings into the political realm both individual and collective desires that previously had 
no place in public life” as populists’ personalist politics allow them to bring certain 
demands by marginalized peoples, such as wage increases and access to social services, 
into the public spotlight. 6 Panizza contends that up until populist leaders took power, 
those aforementioned issues were only relevant to those who it affected firsthand. Panizza 
also contends that scholars insist upon the historical specificity of every populist iteration 
rather than persisting in the search for a totalizing theory of populism.7 Panizza goes on to 
explain that populist styles and strategies take on meaning only within in the context of 
particular political struggles.8 Panizza is saying that any component of populism only 
show up when certain issues are already taking place in a political space. The components 
of populism are not ones that organically show up; they come together when a 
geographical location has the right political climate.  This climate entails unrest with the 
status quo and a need to elevate certain groups of people in society.   
Another well-known scholar that had studied populism is Ernesto Laclau, who 
analyzed how the subjects of populist politics are constituted as political subjects through 
                                                 
6 Jocelyn Olcott, “The Politics of Opportunity: Mexican Populism Under Lazaro Cardenas and 
Luis Echeverria”, in Gender and Populism in Latin America: Passionate Politics, edited by  Karen 
Kampwirth, (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010),  30.  
7 Olcott, “The Politics of Opportunity,” 30.  
8 Olcott, “The Politics of Opportunity”, 31.  
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the pursuit, and sometimes the denial of demands.9 Laclau diverges from other scholars 
by taking a bottom-up approach, examining populism and populist politics through the 
lens of what the people are trying to obtain and what the outcome of those demands are. 
Laclau contends that this process of defining and insisting upon demands inscribes the 
political frontiers with the us-vs-them ideal that permeates populism. Laclau also argues 
that populism is a specific mode of political articulation that emanates from and is 
consolidated in the context of unstable institutions.10 In the Latin American cases, the 
economic and political turmoil brought on by the Great Depression spurred the kind of 
institutional instability that led to populism’s rise, according to Laclau.   
Much of the scholarship tends to agree with Roberts’ suggestion that populist 
leaders found support from previously marginalized sectors, mostly workers. These 
populist leaders faced much opposition during their time in power because they were 
attempting to upset the status quo.   Populist leaders focused their political attention on 
the urban working class and how they needed representation in order to obtain a better 
life.11The change from the classic model of the elites ruling the poor began to upset many  
elites.     
Another defining characteristic of populism is that it was an expansive style of 
campaigning by politicians who engaged and drew the masses into their movements and 
                                                 
9 Ernesto Laclau, “Populism: What’s in a Name?” in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, 
edited by F. Panizza (London: Verso) 2005, 32.  
  
10 For more discussion of Laclau in the Latin American context, see Olcott, “ The Politics of  
Opportunity,” and Stephanie Rousseau, “Populism from Above, Populism from Below: Gender Politics 
Under Alberto Fujimori and Evo Morales”, in Gender and Populism in Latin America: Passionate Politics, 
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held their loyalty, sometimes indefinitely.12 Populists needed to be able to change their 
political platforms in order to keep up with the demands of the people. Populists are often 
men who are well spoken and enthusiastic about what they believe in.  The masses who 
were usually viewed by the populists were those who were considered poor and the 
working class. Many populist leaders used the reoccurring phrase of “for the people” or 
“being one of the people.” Populist leaders would often adjust their political ideology to 
cover whatever the biggest issue of the time was.13 A more contentious issue regarding 
the definition of Latin American populism is the matter of charisma. Many populist 
leaders are often described as engaging and colorful figures.14 However, as will be argued 
later, not all populist leaders were overly enthusiastic in person nor were they highly 
visible publicly.   
These populist leaders faced much opposition during their time in power due to 
the fact that they were attempting to upset the status quo. These leaders found support 
from previously marginalized sectors, especially urban workers. The change from the 
classic model of the elite oligarchies ruling upset many elites. The degree of imbalance as 
it pertains to socioeconomic and political status in Latin America varies, but without 
exception, small ruling classes made up of big landowners, business men, and political 
families dominated.15 Although there was a small middle class emerging, the 
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overwhelming majority of the population lived in poverty.16 Before the intervention of 
populist leaders, the governments were typically exclusive; the rural populations were not 
organized, and industrial workers often lacked strong labor and political organization.   
Another issue that populist leaders were dealing with during their time in power 
was the aftermath of the Great Depression. The Depression and the disruption in trade 
with Europe that the Depression and World War II created were just the latest examples 
of the effects of Latin American economic and social structures that often dated back to 
the colonial era. In most Latin American countries, the economic crisis of the 1930s 
witnessed governments of the Left and Right replaced typically by governments of the 
opposite end of the political spectrum.17 As in Europe, these political irruptions also 
brought about or accelerated economic, social, and cultural transformations, including 
(perhaps most importantly) a transformation in the role of the state.   
As in the United States, the Great Depression in Latin America brought sharp 
drops in employment and was marked by a significant shift in economic policy, 
characterized by state intervention. Both Juan Perón in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in 
Brazil suggested that their respective countries would benefit from state intervention. 
Historians tend to agree that one of the key consequences of the Great Depression was 
strengthening of the state as the Great Depression strengthened the idea that the state had 
a role to play in managing the economy and society.18 The state also saw itself as being 
the only institution that could help stabilize the country after the Depression.   
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Politically, the Great Depression also accelerated questions people had already 
begun raising regarding their place in politics, the representative (or non-representative) 
nature of their governments, and how they could enact change for the betterment of 
themselves and their country. For the “outs” of the old order, the Great Depression 
showed that the foundations upon which that order had been built were profoundly shaky 
and that the moment was ripe for major change, even outright revolution. For the “ins” of 
the old order, the Great Depression forced a reassessment of the assumptions and the 
hierarchies that had underpinned their privilege, if only to avoid more drastic and 
uncontrolled change. In his survey of the global impact of the Depression, as Dietmar 
Rothermund observed, populism was the main political consequence of the slump in the 
region; something Robert Findlay’s and Kevin O’Rourke’s recent survey of the world 
economy reinforces: “The result across much of Latin America was populism, with urban 
workers and capitalists combining to seize power from the traditionally outward oriented 
landowning elites.”19 For these reasons, the Great Depression and the rise of Populism are 
inseparable in many of the Latin American cases.   
Communism in Latin America  
Not only were populists attempting to seize power from those who had 
traditionally held it; they were also dealing with the rise of new radical ideas and political 
ideologies from the left that challenged populists’ own claims on power. These radical 
ideas became the focal point of the populists’ opposition to claims that they were in 
support of Communism.  As World War II ended and the threat of communism spread, 
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Latin America became increasingly worried about what could happen to their country if a 
communist were to gain political power. The social politics of the 1930s, which consisted 
primarily of social programs and social legislation that attempted to alleviated the impact 
of the slump on working peoples, constituted one element, along with outright repression, 
that elites drew on to contain popular discontent and undermine the appeal of Communist 
and other radical movements throughout the region.20   
The Communist International, or Comintern, was an organization that was 
concerned with spreading Communism throughout the world. The Comintern was based 
in Soviet Moscow and was the hub of information on international Communist dealings. 
Each Communist grouping in different countries would send reports to Moscow to inform 
them of the progress in local politics in each party’s country. During the 1930s, the  
Comintern moved away from concentrating solely on working only within the 
Communist Party and began to consider working with the non-Communist left. This idea 
was deemed a popular front strategy and by 1935 had become the official strategy of the 
Comintern. At this time, Latin America was not the main focus of the Comintern, one 
reason for which was that it offered unique challenges for spreading Communism. One of 
the main issues concerning Latin America was that it was considered to be a dependent 
region. This meant that the Comintern saw Latin America as being too dependent on the 
United States. This means that there was a degree of independence that accompanied 
their economic penetrations and domination by imperialism. Another issue why Latin 
America was not a large focus of the Comintern was its economic climate.   
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To the Comintern, Brazil provided the ideal Latin American political climate for 
an emerging popular front to be effectively used by a local party. Thomas Skidmore 
asserts that when Vargas took power in 1930, Brazil awoke politically. This is why the 
Communist Party attempted to oust Vargas in 1935. The Communist Party and its 
members were unhappy with Vargas’ leadership and were an organized group that felt  
that it could do something to rid Brazil of Vargas.. The Communist Party of Brazil (PCB) 
was not a large party in the 1930s, but it had a devoted and politically aware core, 
especially in the figure of Luis Carlos Prestes; however the PCB began to gain control of 
some of the trade unions that were in the process of being officially recognized by the  
Vargas government.21  
In November 1935, military revolutionaries began to revolt, but the Vargas 
regime had anticipated these events. The revolt began prematurely, and the Communist 
military rebels who were to join in the revolt were not able to hold onto the areas they 
infiltrated and were overpowered. 22  This revolt is an unusual case in that the Communist 
Party (PCB) attempted to follow two different styles of spreading and achieving  
Communist power. The PCB used the strategies of a popular front and an armed revolt.23 
In early 1945, with the loosening of Brazil’s National Security Act, the release of 
political prisoners, and an overall general weakening of repression, the Communist Party 
began to organize quickly. The party soon had headquarters in every city and every state. 
The party also penetrated the official corporate union structure, although there is still 
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some dispute among scholars as to what their plans were. The Communists were 
ambivalent towards “spontaneous” working-class action, especially strikes, because at 
this time the Communist party was still committed to class collaboration. It is important 
to note that the communists were often accused of instigating agitation and strikes within 
the working-class unions in order to persuade workers over to the communists side. This 
was a large concern within politics, for the elites, because it looked as if the communists 
were attempting to take support away from Vargas, since workers were his largest base of 
support.24    
The Argentine Communist Party (PCA) was founded in 1918 predating Brazil’s 
PCB by four years. The party was formed out of a group opposed to the pro-Alliance 
stance of the Radical Party government of the time, on the ground that the imperialism of 
the Allies in WW II had nothing positive to offer the working class.25 From the mid1920s 
onward, the party emphasized its worker profile, and it eagerly sought to increase its 
presence in workshops and factories.26  The Communist Party became marginalized by 
the influence of Peronism and as a result had a harder time gaining support with the 
working-class.27 The party achieved its greatest successes when it abandoned the overt 
class struggle and agitated in favor of a center-left Popular front. Communist militants 
presented themselves not as class warriors but as responsible leaders, always willing to 
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improve the conditions of the workers and to institutionalize negotiations between labor 
and capital.28 This meant that the Communists were not attempting to create a completely 
different social order, although many elites saw it as such, but instead a more cohesive 
relationship between labor and capital.   
Among workers the appeal of Communism did not lay in the power of its vision 
of a classless society or in admiration for the Soviet Union’s achievements.   
Some historians, therefore, have argued that the success of Communist unionism 
rested instead in the organizational capabilities and the commitment of its activists, which 
transformed Communism into a powerful promoter of higher salaries and better working 
conditions. While what the Communists were agitating for was of concern to those in 
power in the government, the main concern of the government was that the Communists 
were able to garner so much loyal support. In the wake of the Depression, the Reds’ 
criticism of Argentina as an unequal and unjust society coincided- more than at any other 
moment in the past- with the inner feelings and perceptions of a significant number of 
workers.29   
The issues between the United States, Argentina, and the Soviet Union cannot be 
fully understood without understanding the position of the Argentine Communist Party. 
The relationship between the three centered on the dissolution of the Comintern, in 1943, 
and the change in perspective from the idea that Communism was an monolithic entity to 
one that saw international Communism as groupings of like-minded individuals.30 This 
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meant that communistic ideas had more individualism than before. The Communist 
parties located in different countries could outline their own ideas instead of copying 
verbatim what the leaders in Moscow wanted. Communism was to be seen as a meeting 
of peoples who shared similar ideas and wanted to come together in order to enact 
changes for those in society who had long been on the fringes, instead of a large 
overbearing force that was infiltrating regions with the idea of global domination.   
This meant that countries could adapt communism to the political situations that might be 
unique to their governments. The PCA repeatedly stated its stance by stressing the 
positive virtues of having an alliance between the Soviet Union, the United States, and 
Great Britain, a stance which the Soviet Union fully supported.31   
While the perceived threat of communist infiltration and the concern that 
communists would upset or change the status quo was one that was realistic in the sense 
that there were Communist Parties that were attempting to play a larger role in politics 
than they had before, which could be construed as infiltration, the measures taken to 
prevent “communist” takeover were often excessive. However, the “people” were 
agreeable, at least at first, to the measures that were taken in order to keep them safe.  The 
fear after 1959 that the Cuban Revolution could happen in their own country provided the 
final and most notable justification for turning from more democratic forms of 
government into highly repressive military dictatorships.   
  In the interwar environment, it was fascism, not communism, which was 
seen as the biggest threat to democracy in Latin America and to U.S. interests.32 The 
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Communist Party in Latin America was not always a hated entity. As World War II came 
to a close Communist parties joined in anti-fascist activities.  This provided them with a 
small amount of prestige because they tended to act as an integral part of national popular 
movements rather than an international network. This is one reason why detractors saw 
populist leaders as communist supporters and Communism as an issue: because they were 
largely supported by popular movements. Also during this time Communist Parties were 
legalized or at least tolerated in many countries.33  Once the threat of Fascism was no 
longer an issue, Communism took its place. Elites concerned themselves with replacing 
old fears with new ones. In doing so, the elites were able to create justification for their 
desire to stay in power.    
The return of Anti-Communism in the US in Immediate Postwar context  
  A key moment in the articulation of Cold War anticommunism was with 
George F. Kennan’s expression of containment. The basic premise for containment was 
that communism needed to be kept inside the Soviet Union and its Eastern European 
satellites after World War II; invasion was impractical, but its spread must be halted.  
With regards to containment and Latin America, Kennan stated that the largest goal of  
U.S. policy in Latin America was to prevent military exploitation of Latin America by the 
Soviet Union. While the United States was concerned with Latin America being 
infiltrated by Soviet Communism, they were not very concerned with getting themselves 
involved in the politics of Latin America, in no small part because, in the early Cold War 
years of the 1940s, Europe received the bulk of the US’s attention. This attitude towards 
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U.S. involvement stemmed from the idea of the Truman Doctrine and its desire to help 
protect free people from Soviet pressures; however, the U.S. was putting its own pressure 
on Latin America. Kennan saw communism as the most urgent problem in the the 
Americas, and he was adamant that under no circumstances was communism allowed to 
take power, going so far as to suggest that the United States should not hesitate to 
intervene before police repression by local governments began to take over.34 Kennan 
instead favored strong regimes with US backing in Latin America, in order to stop 
communist infiltration.34    
In response to the threat of communism, the United States’ President, Harry 
Truman, spoke to Congress on what he thought needed to be done in order to combat the 
rising threat, insisting that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.”35 This idea was the basis behind the Truman Doctrine. While Truman’s words 
were inspiring, there would later be issues with his phrasing, the statement implied that 
the United States would become some sort of enforcer in global issues and that they 
would involve themselves in the issues of other countries.  At first glance this would 
seem like a positive advancement in helping to combat communism; however, the most 
glaring problem was that this statement completely ignored the autonomy of any country 
the United States chose to help, even as it abolished the US’s Good Neighbor policies of 
1934-1945. The United States saw itself as a sort of global policeman whose job it was to 
protect weak countries from the threat of communism. On the other side of the Cold War 
                                                 
34 “Foreign Relations of the United Staes , 1950, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, 
Volume II,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v02/d330.  
35 Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 119.  
27 
 
conflict, the Soviet Union sought to extend communist influence in support of social 
solidarity and economic justice.36 At the Inter-American Conference on the Problems of  
War and Peace, more colloquially known as the Chapultepec Conference, in Mexico City 
in early 1945, the US led the Latin American states in declaring a “fervent adherence to 
democratic principles.”37   
The United States supported Latin America’s push for regional security 
organizations, at the founding conference of the United Nations in 1946. Later an article 
was created from a previous pact (the Rio Pact of 1947), that was essentially a mutual 
defense pact that stated that an attack on one participating nation would result in the 
remaining participating nations joining in defense.38 This created a sort of hemispheric 
defense that was supposed to protect the Latin American countries involved. The U.S. 
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, interpreted the article as preserving the Monroe  
Doctrine, since the United States could still take action in Latin America. However Latin 
American countries saw Article 51 would cause the formation of regional security 
agreements that might provide protection for existing governments and place restraints on 
the United States.39   
Through the enactment of the Rio Pact and the Truman doctrine revealed that the 
United States and the majority of the rest of the Americas had a concern about communist 
infiltration. The need for these acts showed that the worry over possible communist 
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takeover began before the end of World War II. This anticommunist discourse appeared 
in US media and populist governments in Latin America in the 1930s. As a result, Latin 
American populist governments began to take an anticommunist stand as will be seen in 
later chapters.   
Conclusion  
As World War II was coming to an end, the leadership in Latin America was 
changing, drawing on some of the democratic language and ideals that the US expressed 
in World War II, most notably in Franklin Roosevelt’s “Four Freedoms” speech. A wave 
of democratic regimes took over in the region and, as Greg Grandin has pointed out, 
where only five Latin American countries “could nominally call themselves democracies” 
in 1944, in 1946, all but five Latin American countries were democratic regimes.40 The 
old ways of having a group of wealthy elites being in charge was starting to worry some.  
In response Latin American countries, including Argentina and Brazil, turned to 
leadership that was based around one central leader. Placing the power of the country in 
one central figure was a troubling prospect for the United States. With the recent conflict 
between the United States and centralized leaders like Mussolini and  
Hitler, the U.S. was concerned to see such strong, powerful men begin to take power in 
Latin America. With the new threat of communism coming into view, there was the 
concern that these new leaders would gain support from previously marginalized groups 
of people who were seen as being more susceptible to communism. As Eduardo Elena 
argues, these new leaders in Latin America stressed popular inclusion within more 
                                                 
40 Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War, Updated Edition 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011) 5.  
29 
 
vibrant national orders freed from threats of social stratification and the 
overconcentration of wealth, at the time when there was a break with many of the 
previously political conventions and as politicians began to identify with the interest of 
the common people.41 It is to these transitional moments we now turn.   
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Chapter 3: Argentine Populism  
When Juan Perón ascended to the presidency, it marked a change in Argentine 
politics and society that would affect Argentina and its people for the remainder of the 
century. Perón centered his policies on bringing political awareness to the working class. 
Perón’s plans for his time as the president centered on providing rights to groups of 
people in Argentine society who previously not had these rights before. He wanted to 
take the power out of the hands of a select few and put it into the hands of the people. 
Perón’s rhetoric, in general and towards communism, followed classic populist rhetoric in 
that he constantly reinforced Argentina’s need to provide for its entire people.  
This chapter analyzes how politics in Argentina went back and forth between 
populist leaders, nationalists, and supporters of a traditional oligarchy. This section will 
explore how the onset of World War II affected the economy of Argentina and how 
increased industrialization brought about a larger working class. This section will also 
analyze how Perón courted the working class and gained their support once he took 
office. This section explores how Perón’s anticommunist policies fit into his overall plans 
to provide for the working class of Argentina. Perón’s plans for combating communism 
provided other benefits for Argentina namely to make Argentina a stronger player in the 
world economy. Perón’s largest goal as president centered on providing political and 
social rights for all Argentines; however, Perón did not separate that goal with his fight 
against communism. Lastly this section will also analyze what steps Perón made in 
combating Communism and the US media’s criticism of Perón’s anti-Communist  
rhetoric.   
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Pre- Perón Period (1930-1943)  
  In 1916, the leader of the Partido Radical ( Radical Party, PR), Hipólito 
Yrigoyen, became president in the first truly democratic elections in Argentine history, 
putting an end to the succession of ideologically liberal but oligarchic governments that 
had run the country since the mid-nineteenth century.42 The PR appealed to the working 
class even though its leadership came from the elites.43 Yrigoyen’s rhetoric constantly 
stressed change in the political system of Argentina,44 and he verbally attacked the elites 
and included the middle and working class as part of society,45foreshadowing tactics in 
Perón’s own rise to power thirty years later. The Argentine constitution did not permit 
direct reelection of the president, so in 1922, Yrigoyen stepped down and chose Marcelo 
T. de Alvear as the PR’s nominee.46 Alvear won the presidency and wanted the support of 
the working-class; however, he governed in a paternalistic and less inclusive style than 
Yrigoyen.47 This disagreement on how best to include the working class caused tension 
between Alvear and Yrigoyen and led to a split in the PR. Yrigoyen once again became 
president in 1928 and attempted to restore policies he had followed earlier by backing 
certain types of labor.48 The Great Depression stopped any plans that Yrigoyen had, as 
the uncertainty of the Depression made it difficult to enact new policies and long standing 
problems began to become insurmountable. These years also saw the start of the 
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participation of the military in the economy and politics.49 With civilian encouragement, 
the military overthrew Yrigoyen.50 The elites felt that Yrigoyen and the PR were gaining 
too much power and influence. Yrigoyen’s inclusion of the working class as a member of 
society upset the status quo and made elites question if they would still have as much 
power as they did before Yrigoyen took office.   
The 1930 coup installed a provisional president in General José Félix Uriburu.51 
With this political turmoil and shift, there was no agreement between the propertied 
classes and the army on what should be done.52 Uriburu supported the nationalists who 
took pride in their authoritarian elitism.53 This authoritarianism took place in other 
regimes throughout the world, namely Mussolini’s Italy.54 The success of other 
authoritarian regimes during this time, whether new or traditional, gave the nationalists a 
sense of legitimacy. Unfortunately, the nationalists started to distance themselves from 
the government and tried to appeal to the army.55 The nationalists demanded the 
establishment of new governing elite that was national and not beholden to foreign 
interests.56 The nationalists were interested in Argentina being self-sufficient and in 
expanding their economy without the help of foreign capital. They believed that the 
governing elite could come from the military.57   
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In 1932, Argentine politics witnessed a return to liberal oligarchical interests with 
General Augustín Justo.58 Despite its successes in the economy, Justo’s regime was 
corrupt.59 Roberto Ortiz succeeded Justo as president in 1938, but his time in power was 
no less corrupt.60 Ortiz came to power through fraudulent elections, just as Justo had.61 
Ortiz was intent on making changes in both domestic and foreign policies, but was unable 
to.63 Due to health issues, Ortiz had to delegate power to his vice president Ramón  
Castillo, who assumed the presidency when Ortiz died a short while later in 1940.62 
Castillo was determined to maintain the existing political system and the policy of 
neutrality as Europe became embroiled in war once again.63   
The beginning of World War II added to the Castillo government’s problems. The 
reestablishment of a genuinely democratic system and later the policy of neutrality in the 
war were to become catalysts for serious disagreements.64 The war impacted the 
country’s economic and commercial relations with the US and Great Britain.65 Argentina 
was in no position to repay the debts that they owed the Great Britain and began trading 
with neighboring countries in order to make money.66 The 1920s and the elections of 
Yrigoyen established a taste for democracy and the hope for popular participation in 
politics within Argentina; however, the 1930s undid what the small amount of democracy 
had done and left a vacuum that somebody could fill by appealing to democratic practice 
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and the power of the masses. Juan Perón would be the populist leader who filled that 
position.   
Perón’s Political Beginnings  
Perón first entered public politics as part of a group of military officers who 
seized power in a coup in 1943.67 The coup had ended thirteen years of repressive and 
fraudulent (though occasionally nominally democratic) governments, and proclaimed a 
new future of order, virtue, and social justice.68 Perón was one of the most influential 
members of the Grupo de Oficialies Unidos (United Officer’s Group, GOU).69 The GOU 
came to power decrying the corruption of the previous order.70 Faced with the bitter cost 
of divisions in the military, the GOU could now prove its capability and advance its 
authoritarian project for “social justice.”71 Perón in particular had railed against the 
previous government’s indifference to popular needs.72  In 1944 Perón became the 
Minister of War and the swiftly gained charge of the National Directorate of Labor, 
which at this time was a relatively unimportant position.75 As the National Director of 
Labor, Perón began to establish relationships with union leaders declaring that “We are 
going to pay off our great debt to the suffering and virtuous masses…the era of Argentine 
social policy has begun.”73  
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On January 15, 1944, the city of San Juan was hit by a powerful earthquake that 
destroyed the majority of the infrastructure of the town. Now the military regime had a 
chance to make good on those promises of social justice.74 The aftermath of the 
earthquake revealed that this area of Argentina, like others, had been built on injustice.75 
While the government in power debated on whether or not to rebuild the city in the same 
place again or not, Perón decided to use this tragedy to his benefit, busying himself with 
putting together aid for the people of San Juan.76 On the day after the quake, Perón went 
on national radio to launch a government-led relief drive.80 He declared the effort “the 
measure of a national solidarity,” inviting every Argentine “to come together to provide 
all the relief that was necessary.”77 Perón’s ability and determination to address the 
people allowed him to set in motion the machinery of his political aspirations. Perón 
might have come to power in a limited way because of a military coup, but through his 
charisma and concern for the people, he was securing his place in their minds for later 
political power. One aid campaign launched the day after the earthquake quickly elevated 
Perón from a second-tier official into a major public figure.78 Perón’s response to the 
earthquake offered people a vision of hope, in contrast to the stern words of other 
officials.79 Perón saw popular involvement as pivotal to any project for transformation.80 
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Thus he called on the people to mobilize and remake the country, a statement that would 
be the backbone of Perón’s later political platform.81   
In this new type of personalist politics that Perón was developing, he made clear 
that, while his policies were to help the working classes and masses in Argentina, he was 
not an ideologue of the left. In September 1944 Perón, now Vice President, outlined one 
of the dangers Argentina faced from Communists as he spoke before the Buenos Aires 
stock exchange and urged them to support the government’s plans of “social justice.”82 
Developing rhetoric that would come to typify Perón’s position regarding communism, 
he argued that if the “Communist danger went unchecked, the government would be 
obliged to fight it with all its might,” revealing a clear antipathy towards communist 
routes to workers’ enfranchisement.83 Perón went on to state that the chances for 
Communism in Latin America seemed “rosy,”84 based on the belief that in neighboring 
countries, Communism had “already taken a firm hold or may do so in the future.”85 This 
statement implied that Argentina needed to make changes, especially to reforms for social 
justice, in order to combat the ever-encroaching communists. In the closing statements of 
his speech, Perón once again stated how social reforms could stop the trouble of 
Communism. Perón said that Argentina was prepared to fight Communists, “those 
enemies of social peace,” by violent means if necessary; however, the “best way to fight 
these dangers is to eliminate the cause of social unrest.”86 For Perón, social peace  
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was defined as Argentina being free of foreign influence, especially from foreign 
capitalism- especially the growing presence of United States companies amidst World 
War II-, and Communism. Perón’s definition of social unrest was thus highly nationalist, 
even as it considered what might happen if the workers of Argentina were not properly 
provided for.   
At the close of his speech before the stock exchange in Buenos Aires, Perón stated 
that “this fight against communist danger can only be done by giving the workers what 
they deserve for their work and what they need to live.”87 Perón’s speech successfully 
took what he considered to be his main issue, social justice reforms, and repackaged it in 
a new light, framing it not just as assistance for the working class, but also as an 
ideological tool to help combat Communism. This reworking of his objective could 
appeal to the elites, given that they were the ones least likely to support reforms for the 
workers. Framing the perceived threat not as equality, but as Communism that would 
directly affect Argentine capital, Perón turned the issue into one he hoped the elites 
would be less antagonistic towards. At the same time, despite his vision of how to curb 
the spread of Communism, Perón, opted not to break diplomatic relations with Russia, in 
spite of Brazil’s and Chile’s urging to cut off relations.88 Perón decided that they best way 
to fight communism would be to rebuild Western Europe.89  
Exploiting his position as Minister of Labor, Perón began to focus his policies on 
helping unions to achieve their goals while building his own base of support among the 
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masses.90  Perón’s focus during this time was on labor and those who worked in the labor 
sector.  This labor-focused strategy did not sit well with the other military officers in 
power, and so on October 9, 1945 Perón’s was removed from all his positions and placed 
in jail.91 Perón’s removal did not shift the focus of the Argentine workers, however, who 
began to agitate and march, asking for the return of Perón. Labor leaders who supported  
Perón threatened to call transport and public utilities strikes in protest of Perón’s arrest.92  
Perón himself stated that the workers were ready to fight for him and his programs.93 On  
October 17, 1945, thousands of protesters gathered in the Plaza de Mayo and demanded  
Perón’s freedom and for his return to power in the offices that he had previously held.94 
This mass gathering and demonstration by his supporters was strong enough to pressure 
the military, which reinstated Perón only a few days later. The workers’ mobilization and 
display of support provided Perón with a platform on which to run for the presidency. 
Although Perón would later insist it was he who called the workers to the Plaza de Mayo, 
the workers were indeed acting of their own initiative and this mass gathering was the 
first step that led to workers having a direct hand in the course of illustrating that they 
now had power in the political arena.95   
In the international arena, relations between the United States and Argentina were 
strained during the later years of World War II. United States policy towards Argentina 
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was based on the vision of Argentina as an enemy state, due to Argentina’s choice to not 
declare itself in support of the Allied side in WWII. 96 Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
concluded that Buenos Aires’ neutrality was a smokescreen for pro-fascist sympathies.97  
Argentina’s refusal to declare support for the Allies also caused hostilities with the Soviet 
Union.98 Perón’s own declarations on the need to fight communism via reform certainly 
seemed as a possible factor spurring Soviet suspicions.  Like the United States, the Soviet 
Union was convinced that Argentina was a pro-Nazi country. Even after Argentina broke 
relations with the Axis in January 1944, its government was still labeled as pro-Nazi. 
This idea pervaded thought well into 1945, where, at the Yalta Conference, Stalin 
expressed his concern for Argentina’s foreign policy, insisting that the basic requirement 
for admission in to the United Nations should be that any country seeking membership 
should declare war on Germany and expressing concern that certain U.N. eligible nations 
in South America did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.99   
Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed with Stalin and indicated that he had taken steps to 
get Latin American countries to declare war on the Axis Powers.100 While several 
countries still had not declared war, it was only Argentina about whom Stalin inquired 
directly.101 The issue was that member nations in the United Nations would not feel 
comfortable having another member- Argentina- that might have Axis sympathies, since 
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that country sought to wait and see who would win the war before choosing a side.102 
Roosevelt agreed with this stance and appeared to exclude Argentina from the U.N., for 
he indicated that only those nations who actively collaborated with the war effort would 
be invited to join.103 Roosevelt set a deadline of March 1, 1945 for countries such as  
Argentina to make a declaration of war.104 When Argentina still acted slowly, the US 
State Department launched an international economic, military, and diplomatic embargo 
against the Perón regime between March 1944 and April 1945.105 The diplomatic phase 
included excluding Buenos Aires from United Nations membership.106 Other Latin 
American countries disagreed with the US’s stance towards Argentina, and forced them 
to partially retreat from its position.107 The US dominated the hemisphere at this time and 
had the ability to force the embargo on Argentina to get what they wanted- a declaration 
of war against the Axis powers. The US decided to loosen its strict embargos because 
they did not want to lose the support and cooperation of other Latin American countries.  
The US wanted Latin America to be in support of their ideas and by ostracizing 
Argentina, the US created a riff between the US and Latin America. By partially 
retreating from their position, the US revealed to other Latin American countries that they 
were willing to work with them in order to secure hemispheric unity and safety. At the 
same time, Argentina’s stance in World War II set the stage for broader US concerns 
about Perón, during and beyond the war.  
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The participating countries reached a compromise at the 1945 Mexico City 
conference. The US agreed to cease its efforts at ostracizing Argentina if they would, at 
last, declare war on the Axis, sign the Act of Chapultepec, and carry out a program to 
eradicate Axis influence.108 The Act of Chapultepec provided three main declarations 
pertaining to hemispheric protections. The first declaration stated that any aggression on 
the US state or the states that have signed this act will be cause for the signatories to 
come together and agree upon what actions to take.109 The second declaration explained 
that any aggression on the signatory states would be in direct violation of the war effort 
by the United Nations.110 The last declaration acknowledged that these provisions were to 
be instated immediately and that each signatory should prepare to take steps to follow 
through with whatever is necessary to protect themselves and the other signatories.111  
The Act of Chapultepec was important because it provided a safety net for 
western countries in case of attack. The countries who signed the act had protection from 
other countries or with Axis supporters within their own countries. The act, while not 
clearly stating so, allowed the US to become more of a protector and influence over Latin 
America. Any assistance that might be needed militarily to stop aggressions would most 
likely have come from the US. The US could use this act as a tool for leverage, which 
they did with Argentina. The US ostracized Argentina until it complied with the US’s 
wish to declare war on the Axis powers.   
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While the United States and Argentina had reached an agreement with the signing 
of the Act of Chapultepec, the Soviet Union was still against Argentina joining the 
U.N.112 Edward R. Stettinnius Jr., a US delegate, argued that Argentina had completed 
the necessary requirements for joining the U.N.; however other U.S. delegates and even 
President Truman were ready to accept the Soviet’s arguments against Argentina.113 In  
March of 1945, Argentina finally accepted the U.S. demand and declared war against the 
Axis powers on March 13.114 Unlike Brazil, Argentina committed no troops or other 
significant resources to the war.115 Nonetheless while their concession to the United 
States’ demands were significant enough for U.N. membership, relations were still not 
good between the two countries and  President Truman remained adamant that the United 
States would not make a defense pact with Argentina until they complied with the Rio 
Pact agreement.116 The Rio Pact agreement was a re-gathering of the countries who had 
agreed to the Act of Chapultepec in an attempt to finalize that agreement.   
In 1945, the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) was weighing in on the situation 
with the Argentine Communist Party (PCA). Agilberto Azevedo, one of the leaders of the 
Brazilian Communist Party, indicated that the Communists in Brazil had made a mistake 
in aligning themselves against Perón.117 Luis Carlos Prestes insisted that Perón is 
“eminently democratic” and that agents are twisting the truth to make him appear like a 
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reactionary kind of fascist.118 During this time, Perón made mention to US Ambassador 
Spruille Braden that a member of the Russian legation had paid him a visit to propose a 
purchase of grain surpluses in Argentina.119 Braden informed the State Department of a 
possible anti-United States alliance, under Soviet protection, between Perón and  
Vargas.120  
 This possible alliance, while beneficial to Argentina, would be detrimental to 
Argentina’s relationship with the United States.  While the US and Argentina were not 
allies at this time, a closer relationship between the Soviet Union and Argentina would 
further disrupt hemispheric relations. Perón was said to have expressed his desire for the 
Soviet Union to become a major supplier in the Argentine market, but the United States 
was skeptical that this would really take place.121 One of Perón’s goals as president had 
been to break Argentina’s dependence of US markets. Perón could achieve that goal if the 
Soviet Union and Argentina could have agreed to mutually beneficial terms, and thus 
Argentina would no longer be reliant on US trade and markets. The mere mention of a 
supposed relationship between Argentina and the Soviet Union was enough to hinder 
positive relations between Argentina and the United States. With Cold War mentalities 
growing, the US did not want any country in the western hemisphere to have alliances 
with the Soviet Union. The US thought that by having pro-Soviet Union countries in 
close proximity to the US, it would be easier for and imagined monolithic communism to 
take hold and spread throughout the western hemisphere.   
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The problems between the US and Argentina were expanding beyond the postwar 
treaty agreements and into other areas, according to one US official. Ambassador George 
S. Messersmith, who succeeded Spruille Braden after Braden’s efforts to meddle in the  
1946 election to prevent Perón’s victory backfired, stated that the break between the  
United States and Argentina was hampering opposition to communism in other Latin 
American countries.122 The United States’ role as hemispheric police allowed them to  
place the blame for the spread of communism in Latin America on Argentina for their 
unwillingness to cooperate with them. In a New York Times article, James Reston 
reported that “Argentina has modified her policy toward the Nazis; we are in the process 
of modifying ours against the Communists.”123 This statement was a subtle way for the  
United States to imply that Argentina might become sympathetic towards communism.  
Concurring Ambassador Messersmith stated that “the break between the United States 
and Argentina is hampering the opposition to Communism in several Latin American 
countries.”124  
Once Perón gained power, his government continued its anti-U.S. rhetoric as he 
followed a course of the “third position” that did not blindly accept either US or Soviet 
guidance and alliances, part of a broader geopolitical phenomenon echoed in India, 
Egypt, Brazil, and elsewhere in the 1940s and 1950s.125 Perón’s third way was 
nationalistic in nature. The third way provided that Argentina would establish diplomatic 
relations only with countries that would benefit Argentina. This third way distanced 
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Argentina from both communism and capitalism, although it established diplomatic 
relations with the Soviet Union and tried to improve its relations with Washington.126 
Economically, this third way also aimed to domesticate markets, bring capitalists in line 
with national priorities, and to protect laboring Argentines as producers.127 The third way 
wanted to establish Argentina as a powerful country in world economics and to put 
Argentina’s needs first before that of any other country regardless of its relationship with  
Argentina. Argentina was concerned with taking care of themselves before anyone else.  
 Perón’s establishment of relations with the Soviet Union of course did not sit well 
with the US. However, Perón was not working with the Soviet Union to be antiU.S., but 
in order to improve Argentina.  The Soviet Union’s communist rhetoric was not initially a 
concern for Perón as much as bolstering Argentina’s economic independence from the 
United States was. Perón was not completely against the United States’ ideas for 
combating communism. Perón agreed that the best way to build up a barricade against 
communism was to rebuild Western Europe, most evident in the Marshall Plan.128 
Perón’s agreement with the United States on this front showed that even though Perón 
may not have always agreed with the United States, he was willing to work with them in 
order to combat communism. The US worried that Argentina’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union would lead to communist infiltration of the western hemisphere. The US 
saw Latin American countries as not being able to withstand or stop a communist 
invasion; it especially believed Argentina was not strong enough to protect itself from 
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outside influences. The US did not want to work with Argentina to combat communism 
as much as they wanted to tell Argentina how they were going to combat communism.  
Another concern that the United States had with Perón was that he was such a 
demanding presence.  The U.S. was concerned with any one person gaining too much 
power in the wake of World War II.  The vast gathering of Perón supporters in the Plaza 
de Mayo in 1946 only heightened that fear. Those supporters were able to politically 
mobilize themselves in ways they had not done before, and to create change in the 
political arena. Perón’s supporters took advantage of the political opening that he had  
offered them to shape national politics themselves. This influence that Perón had over his 
followers was troublesome to the US. Perón’s personalism reminded some in the media 
and government of Hitler’s own popularity before ushering in World War II.   
These groups feared that Perón’s supposed Nazi tendencies and his gaining 
popularity could provide a safe place for Axis sympathizers to regroup.  There was also 
the then-unknown matter of how committed Perón would be to combating communism.  
Perón openly expressed a willingness to work with the US to combat communism; 
however, with all the difficulties the US recently had with attempting to get Perón to take 
a stance against the Axis, the US remained concerned about trusting Perón.   
The United States, however, was determined to make Argentina pay for remaining 
neutral during World War II for so long.129 The United States set trade sanctions that 
began to cripple the Argentine economy.  This did not faze Perón; indeed, in some ways, 
they played directly into his hands, as the disruptions in international trade only 
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accelerated the expansion of import-substitution industrialization and growth in the local 
economy that he sought for national economic autonomy.130 This helped spur Perón’s 
idea of a third way in Argentina. Instead of concerning himself with how Argentina 
would reestablish its previous relationship with the United States, Perón decided to make 
suggestions on how Argentina could become self-sufficient. Perón suggested that 
Argentina begin a program that consisted of two Five-Year plans.131  These suggested 
plans, which echoed Soviet discourse in their title, did not help reassure the United States.  
While Perón’s Five-Year plans were vague at best, just their name was enough of a hint 
of Soviet Communism to concern the uncritical United States.   
The United States might have been concerned with Perón’s possible communist 
dealings but such concerns were likely misplaced, as Perón often spoke negatively about 
communists both during and after World War II.  Perón often invoked the threat of a 
communist revolution and, later, postwar collapse into his speeches.132 In his famous 
Stock Market speech in August of 1944, Perón outlined the danger posed by laboring 
people who were unorganized.133  While the United States painted Perón as a communist 
supporter because of his dealings with the masses of workers, Perón himself was 
simultaneously concerned that if the workers were not organized and did not have their 
needs adequately met, that this would leave them susceptible to communist infiltration- a 
message that John F. Kennedy would echo fifteen years later as he prepared the Alliance 
for Progress.134 The Communist Party in many Latin American countries tended to 
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discuss with people from the working class how they could agitate for better working 
conditions.  However, their focus was not on gaining supporters for a communist uprising 
as much as wanting to improve the workers’ quality of life.  
Perón also spoke out on what his plans were to combat communism in Argentina.  
In an interview he gave with a group of foreign journalists, Perón stated that he would not 
outlaw communism in Argentina, but would let the communist party work as it may 
within the law and Argentina would not combat it with police or other coercive measures, 
but with ideas and achievements.135 Perón’s plan for combating communism fit into one 
of his goals as president, providing the people with what they needed.140 Perón also stated 
that this plan would move the state toward a new form where capitalistic exploitation was 
not possible.136 The Communist Party of Argentina’s goals and rhetoric in some ways 
superficially lined up with some of the ideas that Perón was espousing. In its newspaper,  
Hora, the Argentine Communist Party positioned itself “against Yankee imperialism.”137 
In a statement that seemed at odds with previous and contemporaneous anticommunist 
fear-mongering, Milton Bracker of the New York Times reported that “observers here are 
unanimous in the opinion that the party poses no security problem to the nation.”138 This 
statement is particularly notable in that the United States was supposed to be the 
hemispheric protector against communism, yet here, the language seems to be almost 
accepting of the party in South America.   
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In 1948, now as President, Perón spoke again on his plan to stop the perceived 
threat of Communism in Argentina. In tune with his earlier declarations Perón stated that 
the best way to combat Communism was to “provide for the people and keep them free 
from capitalistic exploitation.”139 Perón claimed that Argentina is “moving toward a new 
state that we are convinced will move toward the suppression of Communism.”140 Perón 
once again claimed that in order to get rid of Communism, the people needed to be 
helped. This ideology followed along with what Perón’s political platform had been from 
the beginning. Perón’s support of the working class and his desire to provide for them 
was not a new strategy. Perón was just re-appropriating his previous ideals of social 
justice from Argentina being independent from foreign capitalist interference to social 
justice reforms will not only stop capitalist exploitation, but also Communism.   
Yet the New York Times reported that Perón had “no intention of trying to outlaw 
the Communist Party.”141 The New York Times report that Perón would not outlaw the 
Communist Party created doubt as to whether or not Perón was willing to take the 
necessary steps to rid Argentina of Communism. Unlike other Latin American leaders, 
especially Getulio Vargas, Perón argued that fighting Communism with violence would 
not be the way to end it. Perón constantly stated that providing for the workers of  
Argentina would be the best way to stop Communism from infiltrating the country. The 
US media saw fighting communism as an all, or, nothing issue. If a country did not state 
that it would violently eradicate communism, it was seen as sympathetic towards it. The 
US media, like the US government, did not want to support Argentina’s suggestions on 
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how to combat communism, but instead wanted to tell Argentina how its suggestion was 
wrong and proceeded to report on how, in this case, a communist ban would have been a 
better choice of action. The US saw Latin America, with the exception of the time of the 
Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930s-1940s, as the “US’s back yard” rather than as 
equals.142   
  In a transcript of a radio address Perón gave in 1945, he declared that 
“capitalism and communism had turned the world into a battlefield and that both ideals 
were wrong” and went on to explain that Argentina would continue its position between 
capitalism and communism.143 Perón continued, “man has been offered a choice between 
capitalism and communism. I consider that at this time both sides are unjust because they 
are far from the truth; they are not in reason.”144 Perón’s statement reveals that he was 
ideologically and dogmatically bound neither to Communism nor to capitalism, but rather 
saw both as the wrong choice. He concluded his radio address by stating “Neither 
everything in capitalism is bad nor everything Communist is bad, both have their good 
and bad sides”.145 Perón’s statements revealed that he did not adhere to any traditional 
political ideology and that he felt that there were issues with both. Printing Perón’s 
statement about both Communism and capitalism having problems but with neither being 
inherently bad left doubts as to which ideology Perón would be more in favor of. The fact 
that the New York Times did not make any mention of what Perón’s political ideology 
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was is telling. It could mean that they were not aware of what Perón was doing in 
Argentina or it could mean that the US was unsure of how to report on what Perón was 
doing until they could be sure he would be a strong ally. The US media excludes mention 
of Perón’s third way concept and its nationalistic overtones. Perón had previously stated 
that his plan to eradicate communism involved providing more for the working class, but 
the paper does not mention this at all in the article. Once again the US did not make 
mention of policies that did not follow their way of dealing with communism.   
  The New York Times reported that this speech amended previous 
statements made by Perón that saw him speaking more harshly about capitalism than 
communism.146 An unnamed United States diplomat claimed to have conveyed his 
feelings to Perón that “he [Perón] had still not gone far enough on getting his attitude 
(towards communism) clearly on record and the Argentine President could go a lot 
further in making plain his stand.”147 In a New York Times article written in 1948 Perón 
stated he was against Communism, but once again he had not outlined a platform that was 
strong enough for the US media. Perón’s constant response on how to combat 
Communism was by giving Argentinean workers more rights. Perón did not threaten to 
outlaw the Communist Party or to lock up Communists. The US media saw this as taking 
a soft stance against Communism. If Perón was not willing to say he would completely 
eradicate Communism, the US media saw him as possibly being lenient to it in the future. 
Perón did state that he was against capitalism as well, but the issue was not his support of  
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United States capitalism, but his being against Communism. Later in the same speech, 
Perón stated, “We (Peronists) are anti-Communist because Communists are inflexible”.148   
Once again Perón made his stance clear that he was not in support of 
Communism. The article concluded with a paragraph claiming that perhaps whoever 
transcribed the speech from Spanish to English made some incorrect choices pertaining to 
certain adjectives and that was why there was some confusion as to what exactly Perón 
was trying to say.149  Perón repeatedly stated that he was not in support of Communism, 
but still the newspaper claimed that perhaps his meaning had been misconstrued. The US 
media did not make a definite stance regarding Argentina because they were unsure of if 
they would need anything from Argentina in the future, yet they could not stop viewing  
Perón suspiciously despite his years of open rejection of communism as an ideology. The 
US media also did not take a clear stance on what Perón was saying on the chance that he 
might turn out to be a Communist sympathizer. The US media was tip-toeing around 
taking a definitive stance because they did not want to have to explain why they 
portrayed Perón as being a Communist sympathizer when they might need economic 
assistance or want trade agreements with his government later.   
  In previous articles, the New York Times quoted Perón as stating that 
Communism can be fought by social reforms which would make the distribution of 
wealth in Argentina more equal among social classes. In a 1952 article, Foster Hailey 
commented that “the social inequalities in Latin American countries make them fertile 
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ground for Communist propaganda.”150 Hailey went on to state that “ self-appointed 
leaders in Latin America need to realize, before Communism takes a strong foothold, that 
they need to appeal to the people with a program for the general good then by using the 
military for their own (the leaders’) good.”156 This statement goes to show just how deaf 
the US media had been to the very messages Perón had been proffering and that they had 
been commenting on. Perón did suggest and attempted to put into place legislation that 
would be beneficial to the working class of Argentina. Perón’s main platform while 
running for office centered on helping the disenfranchised. The New York Times 
mentioned Perón’s social reforms numerous times in previous articles, which should have 
at least been given a passing mention here. Meanwhile, the mention of “using the military 
for their own good” seemed ironic, expressing a politics that the US would increasingly 
accept as they supported a wave of right-wing, undemocratic, repressive military regimes 
sympathetic to US interests throughout the region in the 1960s , 1970s,  and 1980s.  
  Argentine politics experienced democracy early in the 1920s only to have 
politics return to an oligarchic system with General Justo in the 1930s. The small taste of 
democracy that Argentines had with Hipólito Yrigoyen led them to crave more especially 
after the end of the infamous decade. Perón filled that void and readily stepped up to 
make Argentina a greater power in the world economy. However, Perón’s tumultuous 
relationship with the United States hindered much of the progress he attempted to make. 
The US did not trust that Perón would not endanger the western hemisphere. His 
reluctance to declare war on the Axis powers and his courting of the Soviet Union for 
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trade agreements worried the US. This can be clearly seen in the US media. The threat of 
Communism in Latin America worried the US. Perón’s constant rebuking of US policy 
continued after World War II with his unique suggestions on how to combat communism. 
Perón’s alleged reluctance to violently put a stop to Communism constantly appeared in 
the New York Times. Perón’s insistence on enacting reforms to benefit the 
disenfranchised and the working class seemed, to the New York Times, as support for 
Communism. As was the case during World War II Perón’s main concern with 
Communism was not being attacked or influenced by it, but how he could provide for the  
Argentine people and stop dependence on foreign capital.    
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Chapter 4: Brazil  
“We will in a short time confront a very serious situation, perhaps a war, and to 
take steps belying the poetic supposition that we are free in our own house.”151 Getulio 
Vargas spoke these words when he explained in a speech the need for a new constitution 
in 1937. Vargas had concerns that communist infiltration might divide his country. He 
was concerned that communism would turn Brazilians against each other and create a 
climate that could only be ended with violence. This chapter analyzes how the oligarchic 
system of the First Republic led to the political and social unrest of the 1920s and 1930s.  
This section will explore the role of patronage politics in the largest sections of Brazil- 
São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and later Rio Grande do Sul. This chapter will reveal the 
background that provided a niche for Getulio Vargas in politics. This section will also 
analyze how political unrest shaped the later leadership of the Communist Party of Brazil. 
This section will explore how Vargas’s political style of populism influenced his policies 
towards Communism and how the US media portrayed Vargas’s policies on  
Communism. This section will also explore Vargas’s use of the US media to state what 
his anticommunist policies were thereby revealing that the threat of communism in Latin 
America began in the early 1930s.  
The Brazilian First Republic (1889-1930)  
Brazil’s First Republic began in 1889. The establishment of the First Republic 
was the product of a coalition between high-ranking bureaucrats, sectors of the rural  
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landowning class, and merchants in the principal cities who were anxious to contain  
social and political agitation. The social classes that emerged in new areas of economic 
expansion began to argue in favor of a federal republic, with a measure of political 
autonomy. 152 This was most evident in the coffee growing sectors of São Paulo.   
  After the triumph of those regional class interests responsible for the 
formation of the Republic, the central government lost considerable power to the newly 
created states. The political system of the First Republic can be broken down into three 
different levels. At the most local level there were those who controlled the rural 
population of a given area; these men were known as coronéis, or “colonels,” though they 
often lacked any official military office. This was the class of landowners who owned the 
means of production in the coffee growing areas.  Above them were the state oligarchies 
who were effectively a federation of coronéis. This group would include those who were 
in charge of the coffee growing areas who provided the money for their operations. At the 
topmost level there was the federal government, which was an alliance between the 
oligarchies of the most important states, namely São Paulo, which produced coffee and  
Minas Gerais, an agricultural state, leading to the First Republic often being referred to as  
“café com liete,” or “coffee with milk,” symbolizing the pact between the two states.153   
  While the coronéis essentially furnished votes, they depended on the 
influence of the state oligarchies in government for obtaining favors, which in turn were 
the basis of their power over the local population. This was the basis for the patronage 
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politics that were common in the First Republic. The coronéis would provide goods or 
services to peasants; in return they would ask the peasants to vote for their political 
candidate.  Politicians at the state level determined the choice of president of the Republic 
and in turn the federal government did its best to assure that the dominant political 
factions at state level stayed in power by not encouraging political dissidence. 
Paternalism and clientelistic relationships, above all in relation to the rural population, 
dominated social and political life during the First Republic. Rural areas provided the 
ideal conditions for the maintenance of clientalistic relationships. These relationships 
were based on the unequal exchange of favors between men situated at opposite ends of 
the social scale. A tiny minority controlled production and there was an almost total 
absence of public social welfare, and conditions for survival did not allow the lower 
classes to pursue any other course than to seek protection from the most powerful 
elements.154   
  The constitution of 1891 formalized the federal system while at the same 
time giving expression to the distinction of power between the most powerful and the 
weakest states. The election of the president of the Republic reflected the degree of 
agreement or disagreement between the most powerful states. While the café com liete 
system ran smoothly, tensions within this alliance began after 1910 with the entry of a 
third state on the political scene: Rio Grande do Sul, the region where Getulio Vargas had 
political influence and power. The most notable feature of this whole political system was 
the low level of political participation by the mass of the population. The constitution of 
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1891 formally expanded the base for political representation; instead of voting rights 
based on suffrage based on property and income, it was extended to all literate male 
Brazilians over the age of twenty-one.155 While this shift would expand the amount of 
men who were eligible to vote, it would still leave large numbers of immigrant and lower 
class workers without a means of political representation.   
Unrest in the Late First Republic  
 As Thomas Skidmore observed, by the 1920s there was widespread agreement 
throughout Brazil that there was an urgent need to overhaul the political system with a 
growing revolutionary spirit that was on the rise.156 Historically, two states, São Paulo 
and Minas Gerais, dominated the presidential office.157 The presidency alternated 
between the two states- including Vargas’s home state of Rio Grande do Sul- leaving the 
smaller states without any real executive representation.158 Vargas had been one of the 
men to run for president in 1929, but did not win the office.159 Vargas’s loss appeared to 
be another example of the elites in power being able to win control of the presidential 
office, and people in Rio Grande do Sul, Vargas largest area of support, began a 
revolutionary movement, building a broad coalition of support among junior officers, 
nascent middle classes, other states, and tenentes.160   
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While 1930 brought an end to the First Republic, opposition to oligarchical rule 
had been growing throughout the 1920s, perhaps most visibly among the tenentes. The 
tenente movement began in 1922, when army cadets and officers revolted against the 
government which they accused of political corruption.161 The tenentes revolted again in  
1924, controlling the city of São Paulo for around two weeks, and then in 1926 as well.162 
The most well-known and myth-building event that took place as part of the tenentista 
movement was the Prestes Column.163 During the 1920s, Luis Carlos Prestes became the 
leader of a dedicated group of men committed to a democratic evolution in Brazil within 
the social order.164 Prestes, like many junior officers in the military during the 1920s, 
approved of the ideas of an enlarged middle class and industrial proletariat concerned 
with reform of the political structure of Brazil.165 The main idea of Prestes’s beliefs 
revolved around expanding the political base of the country, thus effectively wresting 
political control from the hands of rural oligarchies and big-city industrialists.166 Prestes 
wanted to wrest the power away from coronéis and to have it distributed equally among 
the working-classes in Brazil. This would give the working and lower classes a voice in 
politics and would allow their votes to represent their own interests instead of those of the 
coronéis.  
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 In December of 1923, Prestes and a group of army officers began scheming to 
foment a new revolution designed to unseat the current president. While they achieved 
small temporary victories, Prestes and the army officers ultimately could not hold off the 
government forces. Ernest A. Duff argues that much of the success of the revolting army 
officers was due to the part that Prestes played, as his personality and leadership helped 
him excel during the 1920s revolt.167 Prestes’ ability to repeatedly outmaneuver his 
opposing forces built up the myth of Luis Carlos Prestes and what he was capable of.  
This borderline mythical status would follow him into the political situations of the 
1930s.   
The tenentes received their education during a time of transition for both the 
military and society.168 The role of the military evolved to that of professional soldiers 
who would be removed from politics; however, the tenentes adopted one of the principles 
of the doctrine of soldier citizens, namely, that of the right of the military to intervene in 
politics.169 They believed that the job of the armed forces was to be protectors of the 
people.170 The tenentista movement produced a rift within the military establishment 
between junior officers and their commanders.171 The tenentes were interested in 
associating themselves with higher-ranking personnel to lend more credibility to their 
rebellious actions.172 Unfortunately for the tenentes, higher-ranking officials with few 
exceptions were not interested in supporting the tenentista ideals. This lack of support 
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only strengthened the tenentes’ resolve to cleanse society and the military.173 The 
tenentes themselves were outside of the workings of the government and were involved 
in a struggle against the power structure.174 With the actions of the Prestes Column, the 
tenentes attempted to use military intervention as a means to overthrow the decentralized 
government and to replace it with a more expansive central government that could enact 
social reforms.175   
Getulio Vargas’s political beginnings   
With his 1930 candidacy, Vargas was attempting to wrest power away from the 
hands of the elites in São Paulo and Minas Gerais, bringing an end to the compactpolitics 
that defined the era and shut out most of the public and states from direct political 
participation in presidential politics. Fighting broke out between the military and the 
backers of president-elect Júlio Prestes. When the military outmaneuvered Prestes, it set 
up a junta and president-elect Prestes resigned. During this time Vargas was speaking and 
outlining his program for when he took power. Vargas’ program included promises for a 
new constitution, social legislation aimed at the betterment of the masses, and 
cooperation with central and state governments.176  Vargas’s ideas on cooperation 
between central and state governments reiterated what the tenente movement sought to 
achieve; political power that was shared between the central and state governments 
instead of just by the state governments.   
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Vargas’ ideas on how to change the political system upset the traditional oligarchy 
of the First Republic (1889-1930).  On November 3, 1930, Vargas took over as 
provisional president; eight days later he suspended the constitution and dissolved the 
federal parliament, state legislatures, and the municipal courts marking the first (and far 
from last) example of Vargas taking excessive measures in order to obtain his goals of 
transforming government and its relationship with society. Vargas organized his 
government to meet the needs of the country and its people, mobilizing urban Brazilians 
into a future base of personal political support.177   
In 1930, President Washington Luiz, the last president of the First Republic, 
referred to Vargas as a Moscow agitator who led a Communist uprising to overthrow the 
republican regime, pointing to the ways that anticommunism was filtering into domestic 
politics and discourse in Latin America well before the Cold War.178 Labor-focused and 
paternalistic, most of Vargas’s reform measures were designed to maintain state 
control.185 Indeed, Vargas would later use fighting Communism as an example to defend 
why the state needed to maintain and expand its control in labor and other areas. Vargas’s 
political platform centered on taking power away from the elites who had been in power 
during the First Republic. By referring to Vargas as a Communist from Moscow, Luiz 
wanted to discredit Vargas and what he stood for. Luiz’s statement compared Vargas’s 
rise to power by a military coup with that of the actions of those who participated in the 
Russian Revolution. This was a reasonable accusation because Vargas, just like the 
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people in the Russian Revolution, wanted to change the way politics had traditionally 
been and put power into the hands of those who had always been left out. Luiz’s 
statement attempted to foreshadow what he thought would happen in Brazil; that the 
lower and working classes would take advantage and rise up to take power from the 
elites. This is what happened when Vargas took power. The large amount of support that  
Vargas obtained from the workers of Brazil allowed him to stay in power from 1930- 
1945 and then to be re-elected in 1951. Vargas’s constant appeal to the workers allowed 
him to always have a large base of support.   
Vargas did indeed make a significant break with the decentralized oligarchical 
rule of the First Republic. He crafted a role for government and a drive for 
industrialization, economic development, and national integration that would create a 
“modern Brazil” that abandoned Brazilian dependency on the export of primary goods 
and importation of manufactured goods.179 Like Perón in the 1940s, Vargas’s political 
style was often pieced together from other ideologies, taking and using only the parts of 
each that he saw as being able to work in Brazil. At first, early media reports accurately 
portrayed Vargas as a nationalist who relied on pragmatism more than ideology, thus 
contributing to his characteristic unpredictability.180 Politics in Brazil at this time were 
still somewhat ruled by patronage and negotiation.181 While Vargas wanted to get away 
from the politics of the First Republic, his paternalistic style was reminiscent of patronage 
politics where political decisions were based on what someone could do for the President 
and in turn what could the President do for them, even as he extended state paternalism in 
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new ways. Vargas wanted the support of the working class in order to stay in power by 
having a large voting class that supported him and in return for those votes  
Vargas promised reforms that would benefit the workers.182   
Overall, Vargas’s plan for Brazil was to turn it from a backwater country into a 
modern nation that could play a part in global economics by breaking Brazil’s 
dependence on coffee exports and by spurring national industry. Under the First 
Republic, the Brazilian economy had been highly dependent on a few agricultural crops, 
most notably coffee.183 Brazil exported coffee, using the resulting foreign exchange to 
import nearly all of the manufactured goods consumed at home.184 The specter of 
overproduction and the accompanying problem of violent price fluctuations had become 
acute by the twentieth century. In order to maximize their foreign exchange earnings, 
Brazil resorted to the practice of withholding stocks of coffee from the world market. By 
the 1930s Brazil exported primary products and imported finished goods.   
The dependence on coffee as Brazil’s main export backfired with the Great 
Depression. With people not being able to access their money, luxury items were not seen 
as important as they once were and coffee purchases dropped. The Brazilian government 
expanded its purchases of the surplus coffee stocks as it attempted to compensate the 
coffee growers with loss programs, but the economy could not be stabilized. With the loss 
in export earnings, Brazil’s capacity to import declined further.185 The drop in coffee 
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prices and revealed that only depending upon on product would not always support the 
economy. This is one reason why Vargas was intent on industrialization. If Brazil 
industrialized, not only would it cease being completely dependent on coffee as its only 
export it could begin to produce some of the finished goods that Brazil was buying and 
save money.  
Despite attempting to transform labor, Vargas’s antipathy towards Communists 
and their sympathizers was evident as early as 1931, when Vargas contracted the New 
York City Police Department to send two specialists in Anti-Communist tactics.186 
Vargas also suspended the constitution in order to eliminate the institutional vestiges of 
the First Republic, prompting a brief civil war with the state of São Paulo- a war that 
federal forces won, allowing Vargas to implement reforms even while building a new 
sense of nation with the reintegrated paulistas (people in the São Paulo state) under a new 
constitution.194   
When Vargas took power, there were two key measures which he wanted to focus 
upon; to purge the “corruption” of the old politicians, and make governmental provisions 
to satisfy working-class needs.187 In 1934 Vargas drafted a new constitution for Brazil. 
One tenet of the constitution was that there was now a guarantee of free elections.188 This 
new system did not sit well with the established elites; however, this played right into 
Vargas’ hands as it incorporated millions of previously disenfranchised or excluded 
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groups who could now participate, and who could and often did credit Vargas for their 
inclusion. The new free elections would provide the Brazilian people with the opportunity 
to remove from power the old elites in the national government Vargas appointed 
“interventors” or governors, at state level and put it in the hands of someone they felt had 
their best interests in mind. Vargas supporters were also feeling positive about the new 
constitution because it would now be the government’s responsibility to take care of 
issues in the areas of economic development and social welfare.189   
This new constitution established a new, highly centralized state and reflected the 
country’s increasing nationalism. The constitution provided for an impartial judiciary as a 
check on the previous system of patronage by establishing political offices independent 
from the coronéis. The 1934 constitution also transferred power from the states to the 
federal government.190 The federal government now supervised the production and 
marketing of coffee.191 A chamber of deputies was created to have control over the 
private economy in order to control state-sponsored capitalism.192 In these ways,  
Vargas’s government brought real institutional and political transformations to Brazil.  
The new political system Vargas established would have far-reaching 
consequences. The political groups that were most content with the new constitutions 
were being superseded by a new regime of political activism.193 Politics were now 
becoming more radicalized. The Communist Party of Brazil was rallying large numbers 
of middle-class voters; however, as Skidmore argues, some were more attracted to the 
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leader of the Communist Party (PCB), Luis Carlos Prestes, than they were to the actual 
party itself. This popularity dated back to the 1920s, when Prestes had led the tenentes on 
their long march. By the 1930s, Prestes had further moved left, becoming the leader of a 
more radical faction demanding greater transformations in Brazilian politics that would 
follow a communist path and greater workers’ control of the state and of production. This 
radicalized group of people became known as the National Liberation Alliance and was 
intent on putting together a popular front movement aimed at overthrowing the old 
elites.194 More middle-class voters were joining in the communist cause and were joining 
with militant labor unions to support radical programs.195   
  Building on his success in the tenente movement of the 1920s, Prestes was 
the leader of a dedicated group of men committed to a democratic revolution in Brazil 
within the social order.196 Prestes, like many junior officers in the military during the 
1920s, approved of the ideas of an enlarged middle class and industrial proletariat 
concerned with reform of the political structure of Brazil especially expanding the 
political base of the country thus effectively wresting political control from the hands of 
big-city industrialists.197 Ernest A. Duff argues that much of the success of the revolting 
army officers was due to the part that Prestes played.198 Prestes’ personality and 
leadership helped him excel during the 1920s revolt and provided the justification for his 
placement in power in the National Liberation Alliance. Prestes’ ability to repeatedly 
outmaneuver his opposing forces built up the myth of Luis Carlos Prestes and what he 
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was capable of.  This myth followed him into the political situations of the 1930s, even as 
his politics had been radicalized. Even as Vargas was consolidating the centralized state, 
Prestes had become leader of the Soviet-oriented Partido Comunista Brazilieiro  
(Brazilian Communist Party, PCB) in the 1930s, putting him on a collision course with  
Vargas in ways that would shape Brazilian Politics in the latter half of the 1930s and 
beyond, even as US media increasingly misinterpreted or misunderstood Vargas’s politics  
Communism, Vargas, and the New York Times during the Estado Novo, 
1934-1945   
 After the establishment of the 1934 Constitution, governmental supporters in 
Congress began to have some concerns about communist subversives. Vargas himself had 
been maneuvering to gain more control and to discredit this Popular Front movement.199 
In a cable to the New York Times Vargas’s Minister of Justice, Vicente Rao, stated that it 
was imperative “to give the government suitable tools to crush communism”.200 Rao’s 
statement is a strong one, using language that implied that the perceived threat of 
communism is so strong that steps need to be made quickly in order for the government 
to handle them. Rao does not say that the government is going to merely rid the country 
of communism, but instead crush it- extreme terms that did not mimic the Vargas 
government’s position. The language Rao used provided a clear example of what the 
development of explicit anti-Communist rhetoric in Brazil well before the Cold War with 
which such rhetoric is often associated. That US media reported on his statements also 
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illustrate how anti-Communist sentiments circulated in public discourse via the media in 
the pre-Cold War era in the US media, even from and through foreign voices.  
In April of 1935 the Vargas government passed a special National Security Law 
that gave the government special powers to combat “subversive” political activities.201 
Chapter Two, Article Fourteen of the National Security Law stated that “direct incitement 
of hatred among social classes are crimes against the social order. Vargas used this new 
law quickly ordering police to raid the headquarters of the Aliança Nacional Libertadora 
(National Liberation Alliance, ANL) and seize documents that were later used to prove 
that the Alliance was Communist-led.”202 Vargas went after the ANL because of its 
appeal to the middle-class due in no small part to the ANL’s popular leader Luis Carlos 
Prestes who had risen to power through his status as leader of the Prestes Column. 203 The 
middle-class saw Prestes as a strong leader because he was able to avoid the military 
during his time leading the Prestes Column. Vargas did not want such a large group of 
people to be in support of ideals that challenged his. If the ANL were able to obtain a 
large politically active support base, they might be able to find a candidate to eventually 
topple Vargas. Vargas would not let a group that could potentially threaten his power 
continue to grow and agitate.   
The National Security Act also allowed Vargas to arrest people whom the state 
deemed “subversive.” Among the first people the government imprisoned was Luis  
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Carlos Prestes. Arrested in 1935, Prestes was not released from prison until April 18, 
1945.204 The seizing of the ANL’s documents provided proof that Vargas and Congress  
used to hastily outlaw the National Liberation Alliance and move toward a more 
authoritarian and politically-closed regime.205 Vargas declared that Brazil would remain 
one hundred percent loyal to American ideals and would follow the good neighbor policy 
strictly.206 Vargas’s declaration that Brazil would remain loyal to American ideas showed 
President Roosevelt that he could be trusted to do business with the US. Vargas’s 
insistence that he would follow the Good Neighbor policy showed him in a favorable 
light to President Roosevelt. If Vargas was willing to adhere to US policies such as the 
Good Neighbor policy, then it would stand to reason that he would entertain the 
possibility of working with the US in future negotiations. Vargas even initiated 
negotiations for a trade treaty between the United States and Brazil.207   
In November 1935, military revolutionaries began to revolt, and Communist 
military rebels were to join in the revolt to overthrow the government; however, things 
did not go as planned, and the Communists were thwarted before they could cause any 
damage.208 An article in the New York Times described the revolt as “communistic like all 
other recent uprisings.”209 The New York Times’ wording of that this revolt was 
“communistic like all others” revealed that the Times saw any action against the 
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government was communistic. The author of the article, John W. White, did not go into 
to detail about what other recent uprisings had taken place in Brazil. White could also 
have left out a more detailed description of what other uprisings he was referring to 
because he referred to them as “Communistic” and would assume that the uprisings were  
all the same.    
In the same article, White wrote that “no South American government has fought 
sporadic communistic agitation with more vigor than Brazil.”210 This statement reveals 
the ongoing anti-Communist discourse in the media in the US in the inter-war period, 
even as it operated in the context of an isolationist policy. Implying that Brazil has had 
more than one communist uprising justified the government’s strong reaction while 
implicitly raising the specter of communist revolution elsewhere for Americans to fear. 
Additionally, the New York Times subtly reinforced the United States desire to be an ally 
of Brazil. Reporting that Brazil was making such a strong effort to combat communism 
revealed to the American readers that a diplomatic relationship could be beneficial in the 
fight against communism, even at a time when US policy was directed inwardly as much 
as outwardly.  
 This revolt is an unusual case in that PCB attempted to follow two different styles 
of spreading and achieving Communist power, drawing on both the strategies of a 
popular front and an armed revolt.211 Meanwhile in late November 1935, military 
revolutionaries in the northern garrisons of Natal and Recife began a barracks revolt by 
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murdering their senior officers.212 The coup fell apart because these northern garrisons 
did not coordinate with their southern counterparts which caused Communist military 
rebels to attempt to strike too late. This gave local commands the time to come together 
and stop the rebels.213 This attempted coup gave Vargas justification to gain emergency 
powers and begin his repression of the Left.223   
Vargas’s reasons for wanting these special powers were “that a state of war was 
necessary to permit the recently created special tribunal to try the Leftists accused of 
instigating the revolt and that democratic institutions were still menaced by subversive 
elements paid by international organizations.”214 Vargas’ use of the term “democratic 
institutions” here implicitly defined any activities performed by communist supporters, 
whether successful or not, as a threat to democratic governance. Vargas’ mention of 
international organizations was a way for him to place the blame outside of Brazil.  By 
vaguely referring to international organizations, Vargas could frame the revolts as 
antinational and led by outsiders, rather than by Brazilian citizens. This “othering” 
allowed  
Vargas to reinforce his support for “the people,” implicitly suggesting that it could not be 
Brazilians causing these outbursts on their own, but instead those under the influence of 
despised imperial powers. The Brazilian Congress gave its consent to being under  
Vargas’s control to combat communism and keep Brazil safe.   
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During his first decade in office, Vargas regularly spoke out against communism.  
In an article written in 1936 in the New York Times, Vargas stated that he “would lead a 
never-ending fight against communism.”215 Despite much emphatic statements not all 
were convinced, inside or outside of Brazil, that Vargas might not secretly be leading the 
country down the path to Communism. Brazilian elites were concerned that by politically 
mobilizing the workers, they would turn towards communism and overthrow the 
government, ignoring the fact that Vargas had actually strengthened the government’s 
power in comparison to the First Republic. Vargas’s promises to workers, such as saying 
he would raise the minimum wage, were enough to begin to gain popular support and 
make elites nervous.   
In an article for the Associated Press, Vargas argued that “the workmen in the 
area of Pernambuco had pledged their solidarity to the government” when faced with 
communists who were attempting to mobilize.216 One way in which Vargas attempted to 
gain support from workers was to bring them together through state-sponsored unions 
called sindicatos.217 The sindicatos were created to provide for the workers a safe place to 
have their voice heard, even while completely allowing the state to control labor 
mobilization. In these unions, the workers could air their grievances on conditions in the 
workplace. With these sindicatos in place, the workers would not need to look elsewhere 
for political supports.   
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In that same article, Vargas explained that when he took power in 1930, he did 
give workers more class representation on an equal footing with the employer of power; 
however, he noted that he “did not follow the minority of terrorists that wanted Brazil to 
follow in the Soviet Republic’s footsteps.”218 Vargas’s labor reforms were nationalist; 
they sought to protect Brazilian workers from “foreign” influence, especially that of 
Communism. Vargas’s union was a direct line to the government where a worker could 
have his voice heard, while Communists’ proposed unions, which in Vargas’s eyes were 
just a distraction for workers and were dangerous. The Communist unions were not 
working towards bettering Brazil through its working-class, as Vargas said he was, but 
instead were introducing them to foreign ideas and concepts that would not work in 
Brazil, and were therefore dangerous.   
In a special cable to the New York Times in 1936, one year after the failed ALN 
revolt, Vargas laid out one of his plans for dealing with Communism, asking Congress to 
approve legislation to organize special tribunals to “try all radicals.”219 Vargas’s plan was 
to bring imprisoned men who were seen as subversives or communists- the two terms 
were often conflated- to trial more quickly.220 Vargas was not interested in freeing the 
imprisoned men, but instead wanted to try these “radicals” quickly in order to “rid the 
country of radicals.”221 Vargas claimed that the administration was “feverishly seeking to 
purge the nation of Communism.”222  Speedy trials would have allowed him to appear 
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tough on Communism, and swiftly dealing with the radicals would make him appear to 
have a firm stand against Communism. Such trials also opened the door for Vargas to rid 
the country of any political opponents under the guise of protecting the country. The 
tribunals would give Vargas even more power and influence over who was included as 
part of the Brazilian nation, further centralizing the state’s power. The Communists 
attempts to win over workers through enrollment in non-state-sponsored unions were 
another reason Vargas wanted to crackdown on subversives. Vargas wanted to include  
the workers as part of the Brazilian nation, but only to a certain extent. Vargas wanted the 
workers to be politically aware in order to use them as an untapped resource, just as 
Perón did, to keep himself in power, but he also did not want them to be too politically 
aware to the extent that they would want to agitate for ever increasing rights that he was 
not willing to give.   
In September of 1937, with Presidential elections on the horizon in 1938,  the  
Army General Staff discovered a document purporting to be the battle plan for a  
Communist revolution. Eurico Dutra denounced this alleged plot, known as the “Cohen 
Plan,” and the next day Congress approved the suspension of constitutional rights. In his 
radio broadcast of November 10, 1937, Vargas explained that Brazil must forgo the 
democracy of political parties which “threaten national unity.” Vargas also denounced the  
Constitution of 1934 and established the Constitution of 1937. This new constitution gave 
Vargas even more power as president, declared a state of exception, and ushered in a new 
era in Brazil, known as the Estado Novo, or “New State.” During this time Vargas also 
suspended Congress, declaring it as an “inadequate and costly apparatus that continuation 
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was inadvisable.223 While by many definitions an authoritarian regime, a contemporary, 
Lillian Estelle Fisher, argued that Vargas drew up the new constitution to better meet the 
needs of the nation. Fisher claimed that Vargas was living in a time where things were 
changing rapidly and that he needed to make changes according to the circumstances he 
was living in at the moment, with no concern for the future.224  
Even as the authoritarian-nationalist shift under the Estado Novo was beginning,  
Vargas cited communism to justify his own power-grab. In another special cable to the 
New York Times, Vargas stressed that the Communists worked secretly in Brazil and that 
this was the justification for why there was the request for a state of war.225 Vargas did 
not give a specific date for when he suspected the Communists were working, but this 
cable was published in October of 1937, well before the start of World War II and also in 
the early years after the establishment of the Good Neighbor Policy.  The wording used in 
the article reveals that the US was already touting anti-Communist rhetoric. In books by 
Robert M. Levine and Thomas E. Skidmore, the justification for the request for more 
power from Vargas was referred to as a “state of emergency.”226 The New York Times, 
however, referred to the justification for extra powers as a “state of war,” suggesting a 
more combative stance against communism in the Western Hemisphere. Vargas insisted 
that the new regime had nothing to do with the upcoming elections (after which he would 
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by law have to leave office) and that they would go on as normal.227 While the Cohen 
Plan was the purported reason for this tightening of control, the main reason Vargas 
wanted to gain more power was to prevent presidential elections that were supposed to 
take place in January 1938, as promised by the 1934 Constitution.228 Vargas did not set 
an exact date as to when presidential elections would eventually be held, but did offer the 
vague statement that free elections would eventually take place.229 During that same 
speech, Vargas declared that he would not be running for president.230  
In a 1937 interview with a German newspaper that was reprinted in the New York 
Times, Vargas stated that “Communist and other ideologies falsify the ideal of the 
nation.”231 Vargas described a “Brazilian tradition, of allowing foreign workers who 
come to Brazil to work side by side with us, and to help them adapt themselves to the 
framework of our existence.”232 This was Vargas’ ideal of a nation: one that welcomed 
foreign workers who were willing to become part of Brazil. In this characterization, 
however, Vargas placed Communists outside of such a system, portraying them as 
outsiders with radical ideas antithetical to the nation’s “Brazilian-ness” that would upset 
the status quo and cause problems within a country. Vargas declared that unlike  
Communist or radicals, foreign workers often “adapt themselves to the framework of 
Brazilian workers and therefore are no danger of becoming a negative foreign 
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influence.”233 This statement revealed that Vargas assumed nationalism would win out 
over political ideology; indeed, if there were any political ideology one could consistently 
pin to Vargas, it was nationalism.  
Despite Vargas’s insistence that Communism was an “outside” force, the 1935 
uprising belied such notions. Members of the military worked with Communists in an 
attempt to overthrow the government. If Communist ideology was considered a foreign 
influence, and Vargas was convinced that Brazilians were not susceptible to foreign 
ideology, then the military would not have worked with the Communists. In a statement 
that he sent directly to the New York Times, Vargas insisted that “the new regime is the 
most logical movement against communist tactics” and that Brazil had been threatened 
constantly from outside and within. 234 He asserted that “the Comintern made its point to 
take root in Brazil” through the revolt, and that the previous 1934 Constitution left room 
for communist propaganda.235 Hence, according to him, the new 1937 constitution and 
the Estado Novo were necessary correctives. These extreme policy changes had been 
made before the start of World War II and the Cold War. Communism was framed as a 
problem even before fascism had been eradicated. Vargas often wrote to the New York 
Times himself to clarify or outline statements he had made. Writing to the US newspaper 
himself would allow Vargas to shape the narrative about him for a foreign audience. The 
Times often offered their own analysis of what Vargas said in the cables he sent to them, 
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but by Vargas sending in his own words, he still had control over how he was portrayed 
in US media.  
In these struggles in the name of the nation, Vargas tried to stake a position as a 
partner with the United States against foreign ideologies. He maintained that he agreed 
with President Roosevelt that there needed to be peace throughout the Americas and that 
the “centuries old friendship between Brazil and the United States” would make Brazil 
especially proud to be a part of that peacemaking.236 Vargas saw that threat in 
Communism. His direct contact with the New York Times backs up his claims of 
supporting the United States in the fight against Communism. Vargas’s words are also 
telling in his reiteration that the desire for a state of war by the armed forces had nothing 
to do with upsetting the upcoming elections, but instead had to do with fighting the 
menace of Communism. Contacting a US newspaper allowed him to make Brazil-US 
connections himself, even while he could guide the narrative on his own decreasingly 
open regime in the US media.   
The 1937 Constitution brought other changes to Brazil besides granting Vargas 
more powers as president. The global economic crisis had hit Brazil hard, and as it sought 
new trade partners beyond the US and Great Britain, it began to turn to trade with 
Germany. The introduction of Germany into the Brazilian economy also had political 
effects. However, as seen above, Vargas had been transparent about his nationalism well 
before 1941 the War was reshaping how the US viewed Brazil, not how Vargas’s own 
ideology operated. Vargas was more concerned with how Brazil could help itself out and 
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make “Brazil for Brazilians.”237 Putnam was a critic of Brazilian literature, an antifascist, 
and also served as a writer for leftist publications and the Communist party in  
France.238 Putnam argued that with Vargas’s nationalistic overtones, it was simple for  
Germany to come into Brazil and agree with Vargas that Brazil had been treated unfairly 
by the US and Britain.239 Anti-capitalistic rhetoric brought Brazil and Germany together, 
Putnam suggested, revealing his own understanding of facism not as state capitalism, but 
as anti-capitalist. Vargas was extremely anti-capitalist. He saw the United States as a 
capitalist country whose main concern focused on making and obtaining money instead 
of being concerned about its people. Vargas’s anti-capitalist ideals focused on 
enfranchising those who had always been left out of politics in order to create better lives 
for all Brazilians. Vargas focused on how politics and people could achieve this, not on 
money.   
Brazil’s maneuvering during the 1939-1941 period shows that the Vargas 
government made shrewd use of the rivalry between the United States and Axis 
powers.240 Vargas’ policies during this time were ambiguous. While he proclaimed to be 
interested in Pan American ideals, Vargas courted Axis goodwill. This is why Vargas’ 
use of writing to the New York Times is important. While Vargas was not conclusively 
cutting ties with the Axis Powers, he was actively keeping friendly channels with the 
United States open via media missives. Vargas’ letters to the New York Times allowed 
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him to outline his plans for Brazil, which were positive steps towards democracy in the 
eyes of the US. Even though Vargas had not completely ruled out economic relations 
with Germany, if the United States proclaimed any doubt, Vargas could point to his New 
York Times correspondence as evidence to the contrary. Vargas was not concerned so 
much with establishing working relationships with other countries just for diplomatic 
reasons, but instead he concentrated on brokering deals with whichever country would 
provide the best deal for Brazil. As early as January 1941, Vargas secretly authorized the 
construction of U.S. airbase facilities in the strategically important Brazilian Northeast 
for a future war against Germany, even though the Vargas government had yet to break 
its relationship with Germany. In addition to the placement of the air bases, Brazil was a 
major supplier of strategic materials important to the war effort., getting aid from the US 
to establish national industry in Brazil in exchange241   Vargas declined to immediately 
break ties with the Axis until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States 
entered the war and in agreement with the Rio Conference in January 1942.242 In July of  
1944 Brazil sent an expeditionary force to fight in the European theater, the only Latin  
American country to do so.243   
Vargas, Communism, and the US Media in the Cold War, 1945-
1954  
As World War II progressed and Brazil joined the Allied war effort in August 
1942, Vargas saw that global politics, including in Brazil, were turning more towards 
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democracy.  This change prompted Vargas to focus his attention on a seldom looked at 
portion of society: the workers.  The 1943 consolidation of Labor Laws helped further 
strengthen Vargas as a friend of the workers.244 Vargas knew that in order to capitalize on 
his popularity with the workers, he would need to provide them with more political 
opportunities; thus the creation of the Brazilian Labor Party. Vargas appealed to national 
sentiment by promising to protect Brazil’s natural resources from foreign involvement, 
improve economic planning, with a focus on controlling inflation, and, in a specific 
appeal to the working class, to redistribute wealth among the people.245 Vargas’s attention 
to and mobilization of the working class was a new tactic in Brazil.  Vargas was 
attempting to upset the status quo and to take the power out of the hands of the select few 
elites that were in charge.  The idea that the lower classes should have any power was a 
frightening one for those who were already in power.  The very tenet of communist 
thought was predicated on the idea that “the people” could rise up and take power due to 
their large number and political mobilization.   
However, those appeals would have to wait. In the face of mounting pressure 
against the lack of elections or democracy since the 1937 formation of the Estado Novo, 
Vargas stepped down when the military threatened to forcibly remove him. In typical 
populist/Vargas fashion, he spoke to the Brazilian people and informed them that any 
decision he made was for their “aspirations and legitimate interests.”246 Even as he was 
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being ousted by the military Vargas still took the time to speak to the people, and remind 
them that he was on their side.    
When President Eurico Gaspar Dutra was elected president on December 2, 1945,  
Vargas’ political discourse reform had dramatically transformed since the falsified 
“Cohen Plan” of 1937. In pointing to the path towards national progress, Vargas 
proclaimed that there were two ways to transform the nation: one was liberal democracy, 
symbolized in Dutra’s election, and “the other way, besides old liberal capitalist 
democracy, is socialist democracy of the workers. To that I belong and will fight on 
behalf of the people.”247  With Dutra’s opposition to Vargas, Vargas began to set up the 
foundation for his eventual return to power when Brazil turned to democracy.248 Dutra 
constantly appealed for a return to normalcy in the wake of fifteen years of Vargas’s 
shifting governments- provisional, constitutional, and dictatorial, all with elements of 
populism.249 The Dutra administration barely had time to get settled in before Vargas 
admirers began to organize for his candidacy in the elections of 1950. Vargas worked 
under the aegis of the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (Brazilian Labor Party, PTB), which 
he created shortly before being forced from public office in 1945 and he encouraged 
workers to join.250 He did not speak out against President Dutra, instead speaking on a 
platform of trabalhismo, which was a mixture of social welfarism, working-class political 
activity, and economic nationalism, reflected in the name of the PTB itself.251   
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Vargas’ departure from the presidency in 1945 led to noticeable changes in Brazil.  
One issue was the specter of Vargas’ personality. While not as visibly personalist in his 
politics as Perón he was nonetheless always lurking near the political stage, watching and 
waiting and even being elected as Senator from two different states (his home of Rio 
Grande do Sul, as well as Rio de Janeiro, though he did not actively serve for either). 
Nevertheless, his election in two separate states (legal under constitutional and electoral 
rules at the time) revealed his ongoing popularity among many despite his ouster. Even 
after Vargas was removed from office in 1945, he continued to speak out on behalf of the 
Brazilian workers. Vargas backed PTB candidates for election to Congress in order to put 
his supporters into office. Vargas claimed that the PTB would be the party most likely 
“bring happiness to all Brazilians” through its political philosophy. As leader of the PTB, 
Vargas spelled out what his and the PTB’s political philosophy would be: that of 
trabalhismo. This platform was no different from previous political ideals that Vargas 
had; however, by the late 1940s, Vargas was using the PTB, not the state, in his promises 
to deliver. Vargas was building himself as a democrat instead of the dictator that he had 
been during the Estado Novo years.252 Vargas’s defeat in the 1945 elections showed that 
Brazil turned towards a more democratic country, and Vargas was prepared to use that to 
his advantage.   
Vargas was out of the presidential office in 1946, but that did not mean that he 
disappeared from US news coverage. Indeed, his shift in rhetoric with the PTB led to a 
very different portrayal of Vargas in US media than he had experienced in the 1930s. 
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Frank L. Kluckhohn’s article on the “Communist Peril in Latin America” focused on 
Brazil, Chile, and Argentina. On Brazil, Kluckhohn reported that Communists were being 
blamed for a series of “price riots” that had taken place in Rio de Janeiro. Kluckhohn 
asserted that dealing with the Communists would be easier for President Dutra if it were 
not for Vargas, stating that Vargas had been “flirting” with the Communists in an attempt 
to regain power.253   
Kluckhohn’s own position was perhaps unsurprising in hindsight. He was a Chief  
South American correspondent for the New York Times. In 1955, Kluckhohn became the  
Assistant secretary for Security and Consular Affairs in the federal government. It is 
during the mid-1950s that Kluckhohn wrote his book, The Naked Rise of Communism, in 
which he outlines what exactly Communism is and where it began. Kluckhohn states that 
he wrote this book in order to inform the people what exactly Communism was and to 
make sure people were not left unguarded by their lack of knowledge. Kluckhohn’s text 
traced the establishment of Communism in the Soviet Union and other countries; 
however it did not discuss Communism in Latin America. Kluckhohn’s decision to leave 
Latin American Communism out of his book is an odd choice. Kluckhohn wrote about 
Communism in Latin America for the New York Times, so he would have had access to 
information about Latin American Communism during the time that he was writing his 
book. He also had no trouble referring to Vargas as a Communist and it would have been 
reasonable for him to even briefly mention this in his book.254 Kluckhohn’s own 
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avoidance of any mention of Latin America in his text reveals the broader problem with 
scholarship on the pre-Cold War era. Mentions of communism before the affixed date of 
the beginning of the Cold War are glossed over or entirely ignored, even when the author 
has the facts in their possession.   
This emphasis on Vargas’s vaguely threatening and alleged ties to “communism” 
was a theme that became common in later reports on Vargas and his administration, 
reflecting broader transformation in the very early years of the Cold War. Kluckhohn did 
not go on to explain how or why Vargas was attempting to use the Communists to regain 
power. It could have been that the prevailing thought during this time was that there was 
no justification for working with Communists. The strategy of Containment backed this 
vision up, with its plan to prevent the spread of Communism. Stating that Vargas was 
even considering looking to Communists for any type of support was damaging. Already 
in 1946, well before points of tension like the Berlin Airlift or the Korean War, well 
before the fear mongering preceding the 1954 CIA coup in Guatemala or Fidel Castro’s 
victory in Cuba in 1959, a leading paper in the US was already expressing concern 
regarding Communists taking power in Latin America.255 This report singled Vargas out, 
even with that one sentence, as possibly being a Communist sympathizer, even while just 
nine years earlier, Vargas had written in those same pages of his antagonism to 
Communism. Yet by 1946 that no longer mattered to Kluckhohn; Vargas had not spoken 
poorly of socialism, and so in a Manichean vision of the Cold War world as “ overt 
capitalist or communist,” Kluckhohn painted Vargas as a Communist.  
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Such portrayals continued as the Cold War developed. An article written in early  
1949 continued to question Vargas’s alleged courting of the Communist Party in Brazil. 
The article stated that the PTB, headed by Vargas, set out its platform in a way that 
implicitly equated the PTB with Communism, even as it failed to outline what the PTB 
stood for.  The article reported that “Vargas had set out a platform,” but did not report 
what that platform was.256 The article then went on to say that Vargas and the PTB had 
been described “in some sections of the press” as sympathetic to certain plans of Luis  
Carlos Prestes.257  
Yet there are problems with this portrayal that tell us less about Vargas’s politics 
and more about how US anticommunist fears shaped the media’s portrayal and 
understanding of Vargas and Brazilian politics in the Cold War. In claiming that “some 
sections of the press” had described Vargas as sympathetic to Communist ideas, the 
report perpetuated fabricated and unsubstantiated anticommunist claims. The New York 
Times itself printed such claims only a year earlier. The Times failure to mention that they 
were the ones to refer to Vargas as sympathetic to Communist ideas is problematic. It 
only says that some sections of the press had proclaimed this truth, but it does not 
mention any names. It could be that the Times attempted to create the idea that more than 
one source had made these claims; yet the claims against him were themselves vague to 
the point of being empty. As they appeared in the 1948 article, the claims of supposed 
association with the Communist Party were mentioned briefly and not explained in any 
detail. This would suggest that the United States was attempting to keep its distance just 
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in case relations with Brazil deteriorated. By claiming that there could possibly be 
support for Communists from Vargas, the United States could later claim, if need be, that 
they did not support him or Brazil because of their Communist ties. It could also provide 
justification for ousting Vargas if need be. The justification provided by the claims in the 
newspapers could be backed up by the Truman doctrine and its claims to want to protect 
other nations from foreign or local threats.   
  On January 3, 1951, Vargas was elected president in an open and 
democratic election. Vargas chose to concentrate on stepping up industrialization in the 
name of national development and economic autonomy- a preoccupation of his dating 
back to the 1930s.258 Vargas was also still against foreign investment in Brazilian  
industries and an advocate for economic nationalism. Vargas wanted Brazil to work 
towards stabilizing its own economy instead of relying on bailouts from foreign 
investors. Vargas stressed that Brazil needed to focus on internal economics to stabilize 
the country, and to do this he nationalized the petroleum industry and the electric 
industry.259 Nationalism was a strategy that could bring Brazilians from different classes 
together with a sense of community. The fact that one might be an industrial worker or a 
banker did not matter; under nationalism, being Brazilian was what mattered most. 
However, members of the Brazilian Communist Party wanted to practice radical 
nationalism predicated upon the idea that foreign investment needed to be removed from 
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Brazil in order to have a redistribution of power among the classes.260 Vargas sought 
autonomy and social reform, but not on nearly such a radical scope.   
  There was another issue with Vargas’s ultimately precarious dependence 
on economic nationalism. He tried to combine his nationalist and orthodox approach in a 
complex strategy aimed at maintaining the support of different classes. His mixed 
approach to economic policy-making was political, inspired by the need to maintain wide 
support. However, the problem of inflation led to social tensions, upsetting the 
distribution of income and creating uncertainties about future income. The people who 
were affected the most by inflation were the workers. There had not been a wage increase 
since the one Vargas had decreed in 1943, and although in 1951 Vargas decreed a new 
minimum wage, it did not match recent price hikes.261 That meant that Vargas’s largest 
groups of voters were the people who were suffering the most. It also meant that the 
measures that Vargas took were not enough to help them.   
Throughout 1952-1953, Vargas made attempts to stabilize the economy and to 
placate all sectors of Brazilian society. Vargas continually blamed foreign investors for 
the economic problems in Brazil. Vargas needed to pass anti-inflation legislation, but 
knew that it would be unpopular, hence his strategy to blame foreigners.  By blaming 
outside influences, Vargas hoped to gain political support at home. By early 1954, 
workers were striking to oppose the rise in the cost of living and to demand the minimum 
wage be raised again.262 Vargas’s early strategy of enfranchising the workers started to 
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backfire on him. The workers had become politically aware enough to realize that they 
could agitate for more rights, rights which Vargas had always said he supported.    
In July of 1954, the Brazilian Congress upheld Vargas’ decree to double the 
minimum wage.263 The prevailing thought of non-Communists was that the wage decree 
would be detrimental to Communists, countering the latter’s propaganda that stated the 
courts were conspiring with employers to have the decree declared unconstitutional.264  
The New York Times article reporting on the wage increase claimed that Communists in 
Brazil had begun a “series of meetings in private homes to plan a strategy for the 
upcoming elections,” despite the fact that the Dutra government made the PCB illegal in 
1948 and that they remained mobilized for elections in 1954.265 The New York Times 
suggested Communists were fighting to get political favor in the hopes that they would 
achieve political office. The article even went on to make the scare-mongering and 
unsubstantiated claim that the wage bill that Congress passed that would also reinstate the 
PCB.266 This fact is only mentioned once in this article, but it seems to be a bit of 
foreshadowing. In following articles on Brazilian politics in the New York Times, there 
were mentions of how Vargas and the Labor Party were in support of Communists. This 
reporting, while not accurate, could have created doubts in the minds of American 
readers. These unsubstantiated claims that working with the Brazilian Labor Party would 
be beneficial also revealed that the American media was interested in perpetuating 
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antiCommunist rhetoric. A previously symbiotic relationship between the United States 
and Brazil seemed to fall apart in the press.   
Anti-Vargas groups that first showed up during Vargas’s campaign in 1950 
increasingly spoke out against Vargas and his reluctance to raise the minimum wage. One 
of his leading critics was Carlos Lacerda. Lacerda, a spokesman for the conservative 
União Democrática Nacional (National Democratic Union) and its middle-class base, 
often spoke out about the incompetence of Vargas.267 Lacerda’s appeals to the 
middleclass gained him a large following. The middle-class felt ignored by Vargas’s 
policies, which were aimed at elevating the working class. Just as it was during the First 
Republic, elites did not want the division between social classes to be smaller than it had 
previously been. Lacerda dedicated his energy to undermine Vargas and used assistance 
from Brazilian elites, along with his own newspapers to do so.268 Lacerda spearheaded 
the ouster campaign that indirectly set in motion the events leading to Vargas’s suicide in  
August 1954.269   
After Vargas’s suicide, the New York Times began printing articles that called into 
question Vargas’s distrust of the Communist Party. In a 1954 article printed the same 
month as Vargas’ suicide, Sam Pope Brewer wrote that events since the suicide had 
strengthened the impression that there was an alliance between Vargas’s PTB and the 
Communists. Brewer went on to assert that there were “many reasons” to think that the 
Vargas administration had an agreement with the Communists, namely to get votes. 
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Brewer contended that, by voting with the administration, Communists could get their 
own candidates into power without overtly declaring that they were Communists.270 The 
supposed plan by the Communists to get votes would have worked because the  
Communists would not have been running for office as part of the Communist Party.  
Instead, the Communists would be running for office under as part of the Brazilian Labor 
Party. Even the title of the article, “Tie to Reds Seen in Vargas Party,” sounded more 
salacious than it really was, especially since the Communist Party had already been 
declared illegal and that, even with these overtures to “socialist democracy,” Vargas had 
long opposed Communism, defining it as foreign. The eye-catching title makes it seems 
as if Vargas himself was openly supportive of Communists, which the article did not 
provide evidence for. Vargas’ suicide opened the door for speculation as to why he killed 
himself, even though he did explain himself in a suicide note, and his death gave Brewer 
and others the opportunity to make outlandish claims against someone who can no longer 
defend themselves.   
Getulio Vargas spoke out against Communism before the start of the Cold War. 
Vargas outlined what his policies towards fighting Communism in Brazil through the 
medium of the New York Times. At home, Vargas passed the National Security Act to 
enable him to deal with Communists quickly. Vargas’s dependence upon the 
workingclass as the backbone of his political support brought him into contact with 
Communists who were also looking to gain the support of workers while the middle-class 
was left feeling unrepresented. Vargas’s opponents took advantage of elite antagonisms 
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and of  the under-represented  (yet still minority) middle-class and they often spoke out 
against Vargas. 
Vargas’s supporters took matters into their own hands which ultimately led to 
Vargas’s suicide. After his death, the New York Times reported that Vargas was 
sympathetic towards Communism. Vargas’s policies towards Communists revealed that 
he took what measures he saw necessary; however, with this issues of inflation and a 
consistently unsatisfied working-class, Vargas was not able to establish more substantive 
measures against Communism. Vargas fought Communism, much like Perón, in that he 
fought it the way he most saw fitting. His real concern was for the Brazilian people and 
how Communists were attempting to sway them away from what Vargas saw as 
traditional Brazilian ideas. Vargas had many different important issues to contend with, 
the perceived threat of Communism was one that occupied his time. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion  
In response to the Russian Revolution of 1917, US elites and politicians spurred a 
“Red Scare” that its allies throughout the world replicated. The revolution perpetrated by 
a large group of the country’s peasants and urban proletariat in order to end the traditional 
political system was a radical action. The Russian peasants and workers were a 
disenfranchised group of people who were unhappy with their lives and acted to do 
something to enact changes. Countries were worried that the events that took place in  
Russia might possibly take place in their own countries. While this fear did exist before  
World War II, it was reignited by the fight against fascism. The United States and Great 
Britain were concerned that once fascism was eradicated, communism would step up and 
take its place as a new dominant ideology. Communism’s appeal to the lower classes of 
society provided it with a large base from which to draw support, another reason for the 
US and Great Britain to be concerned. The two countries were at first mostly concerned 
with the threat of communism in Europe; however their focus shifted after by the 1950s.  
  In Latin America during the 1920s and 1930s, the political climate 
resembled that of the period before the Russian Revolution. The lower classes were 
becoming more politically aware and unhappy with their position in society. The 
traditional oligarchy and its use of patronage politics was falling out of favor. Instead 
there was a call to instill political leaders who would concern themselves with the rights 
of all peoples, not just those who were financially able to hold political power. This 
concerned those who already held the power. The 1930s and 1940s in Latin America saw 
the rise of populist leaders who were willing and able to create more for the lower 
classes. These populists, like Vargas and Perón, aimed their policies at providing a place 
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in politics for the working class so that they would be included as members of society. 
Once the working class became aware of these populist leaders, they began to 
demonstrate and agitate for them to ascend to the presidency.   
From the 1930s through the early 1950s and beyond, Communism was an 
important issue in Latin American politics. While Argentina and Brazil were both 
concerned, at one time or another, with fighting fascism at the time, Communism had 
started to spread and quickly replaced fascism as the ideology to be wary of. Vargas’s and 
Perón’s close relationship with the workers was one reason their detractors became wary 
of communism spreading throughout Latin America. Their close relationship with 
workers also concerned the US. Both Perón and Vargas sought political support from the 
working class, but the Communist Parties in Argentina and Brazil also sought out the 
working class. The Communists were hoping to educate the workers and lead them to the 
realization that their voices needed to be heard, just as Perón and Vargas were doing. 
Both the populist leaders and communist leaders were interested in getting the working 
class to ask for more rights in order to elevate their status in society. This quest for 
worker support by both sides was seen as collusion by outsiders such as the United States. 
The US saw the working class as being able to be swayed into supporting communism, a 
fear that both Perón and Vargas had as well. This is one reason why Perón and Vargas 
were working to provide for the workers: as a means to keep them from being influenced 
by communism.  
Scholarship traditionally sees the Cuban Revolution as the rise of a Red Scare in 
Latin America; however, fear of Communism well pre-dated 1959. As this thesis has 
illustrated, there already were fears of communist infiltration in the 1930s and 1940s.   
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The Cuban Revolution only confirmed the fears that a communist style takeover could 
occur in Latin America, although it took place under a unique set of circumstances and 
provided justification for militaries to take power in order to fight Communism. 
Communism and Communist Parties existed in Latin America before the 1920s, in many 
ways that shaped political life not just in the 1960s-1980s, but also in the 1930-1950s. 
Once reason for this could be that Communist parties were outlawed for a number of 
years in Latin America; however, this would not mean that communism just went away. 
Even though the Communist Party might have been illegal for a time, the fear of 
communism was still there. This work has provided numerous examples of the United 
States’ media reported on the threat of communism in Latin America, yet scholarship 
overlooks these examples.   
Both Vargas and Perón spoke out against communism, with a vehemence much 
scholarship has glossed over. With the Great Depression, World War II, and the aftermath 
of both, communism was not the main focus of Vargas’s or Perón’s attention; however it 
was an important enough issue that they spoke out on what their anticommunist plans 
would be as they defined their own nation-building projects. Perón and Vargas had 
differing ideas on what was the best way to combat communism, through social reforms 
or through violence, but they still revealed those plans to their nations. Media in the US 
also reported heavily on what steps Perón and Vargas took to combat communism.  
  The United States media, specifically the New York Times, questioned 
whether populist leaders Juan Perón and Getulio Vargas were supportive of Communism 
or not. The Times journalists who reported on Brazil and Vargas were varied, yet 
coverage in the New York Times oftentimes was consistently misrepresenting populism in 
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its reporting. Frequently, articles about both Perón and Vargas stated the two did not have 
plans for combating communism in their countries; however, previous articles had 
already reported on what Perón and Vargas outlined as their policies towards 
communism. Ultimately, the New York Times articles reflected not only what policies on 
Communism were in Latin America, but also they revealed the attitude of the US towards 
communism and anti-communist policies.  
 The New York Times reported that Perón did have a plan for combating 
Communism and that any steps he proposed to take against communists were not likely to 
work. The Times’ portrayal of Perón revealed him to be a man who was not willing to 
take the necessary steps to combat Communism, which would be to outlaw it completely 
or to threaten to bring it to a violent end. Perón frequently gave speeches outlining how 
he hoped to combat Communism, but the Times did not think that his plans were enough. 
US media saw Perón’s plans for social reforms as a strategy that would be favorable to 
the communists. While Perón never openly supported communism, he did state that there 
were some favorable aspects to it which caused the Times to see him as sympathetic 
towards communism. The convoluted relationship between the US and Argentina during 
Word War II continued into the early Cold War era.   
On the other hand, at least in the early years of Vargas’s first presidency, the New 
York Times reported that Vargas’s plans to eliminate communism were the right ways to 
handle communists. The strained relationship between Perón and the US played a role in 
his negative portrayal in the media. Vargas unlike Perón repeatedly stated that he would 
completely rid Brazil of communism. Perón never fully denounced communism as did 
Vargas. Vargas’s suggestions for combating communism, unlike Perón’s, were aimed at 
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completely eradicating it and to lock up those who were considered subversives. Vargas’s 
close relationship with Brazilian workers was a cause of concern for the US. Communists 
also attempted to court the workers for their support. After Vargas’s suicide, the New 
York Times changed its stance on Vargas and reported that he had most likely been a 
communist sympathizer. Vargas’s close ties with the working-class and the communist’s 
attempts to court the workers led the US media to suspect that Vargas would accept 
support from the Communist Party in elections.   
In Argentina, Juan Perón was most concerned with providing a place in society 
for those of the working class and creating an Argentina that was for the Argentine 
people. These concerns did not stop him from being worried about communism. Perón 
frequently spoke out about plans to combat communism in Argentina. Perón combined 
his nationalism with his desire to keep communism at bay by stating that the best way to 
combat communism was to enact social reforms. Perón wanted these reforms to aide the 
working class, but structured his anticommunist rhetoric to fit into his overall plans for 
Argentina. This early instance of anticommunist rhetoric also revealed that Perón saw the 
need for changes elsewhere in the world in order to combat communism, he stated that 
rebuilding Western Europe would keep communism from spreading. Perón saw 
Argentina as being able to keep communism away by continuing to focus on its 
nationalism. Perón saw no need to fight communism violently and was certain that by 
making Argentina less dependent on foreign help, communism would not come to 
Argentina. Perón did not seek to explain his decisions directly to the United States, but 
instead spoke with assurance that his decisions would work for Argentina.   
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The use of the New York Times articles provided this project with an expansive 
amount of information that unfortunately, could not all be included. This plethora of 
information could lend itself to a larger project on how the Times reported on Latin 
American communism with more specified dates than were used here. There is also the 
possibility of expanding the research to include other Latin American Countries with 
populist leaders during the years before the Cold War and to compare and contrast such 
leaders’ portrayal in US media with each other. There is also the possibility to expand the 
research here to include the years immediately following Perón’s and Vargas’s 
presidencies to the start of the Cuban Revolution until the creation of military 
dictatorships. The secondary scholarship used within this work also could be used to 
expand research into the years immediately before the Cuban Revolution.  
In Brazil, Getulio Vargas also had other concerns besides communism; however 
he still spoke about the need to keep communism and communists out of Brazil. One 
issue Vargas dealt with was his desire to stay in power. Anti-Vargas regimes constantly 
tried to force Vargas out of office. Vargas also dealt with reactions to his gaining more 
power for the president. While these two issues were both of importance, they also played 
a role in Vargas’ anticommunist policies. Vargas’s constant worry over whether or not he 
would be ousted weighed heavily on him, hence his desire to gain more power. Vargas 
creation of the National Security Law not only gave Vargas the power he wanted, but also 
provided him with a way to combat communism. Vargas’s anticommunist rhetoric was 
violent and decisive. The National Security Act allowed for Vargas to get rid of his 
opponents by suggesting, even slightly that they might harbor procommunist tendencies.   
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Vargas, like Perón, wanted to provide for the working class. The major focus of 
Vargas’s anticommunist rhetoric centered on the need to provide for the workers of 
Brazil and to allow the government to have control over the countries labor force. 
Brazil’s communist party also wanted to influence the workers, but by Vargas being so 
focused on the welfare of the workers, he could keep them from being swayed by 
communist ideologies. Vargas felt the need to contact the US media in order to state what 
his anticommunist policies would be. Vargas repeatedly wrote to the New York Times 
where he explained and outlined what his anticommunist policies would look like and 
why he felt they were necessary. This almost constant correspondence worked favorably 
for Vargas because it meant that in case of an attack on his regime by communists, the 
US would be on his side.   
The US media oftentimes changed its position on what it thought of both Perón 
and Vargas. The US media would question if Perón or Vargas were being sympathetic 
towards communist parties in their countries and would question if they were doing 
enough to stop the spread of communism. The US was unsure of Perón commitment to 
combating communism. Perón’s claims of providing social reforms for the Argentinean 
workers did not seem like a drastic enough step for the US in the fight against 
communism. Perón’s refusal to denounce communism as a completely terrible ideology 
provided the US media with justification to question whether Perón really wanted to rid 
Argentina of communism or not. The US media seemed pleased with Vargas’s plans for 
combating communism. Vargas’s proposed policies of violence towards communists fit 
into what the US saw as the proper way to fight communism, by completely getting rid of 
it. Vargas’s constant communication with the New York Times and his stance on how to 
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rid Brazil of communists allowed for him to be viewed favorably by US media. After 
World War II, the United States focused its attention on fighting communism the same 
way as Brazil; however, the US did not see this way as working for Brazil. The United 
States took its role from the Truman Doctrine, as a global enforcer, seriously and was 
concerned that without their interference, any fight against communism in Latin America 
would not succeed. Furthermore, with the US’s view of Latin America as a sort of 
backyard to the US, it is not surprising that they would think any plans to combat 
communism would not be successful in Latin America.  
Media in the US reported on the threat of communism in the early 1930s and 
1940s. Both Argentina’s and Brazil’s leaders set out to enact policies that would stop 
communism from infiltrating their countries. Scholarship states that the Cuban 
Revolution created the fear of communism throughout Latin America; however, this 
thesis has shown otherwise. The threat of Communist infiltration in Latin America began 
in the early 1930s and continued well into the 1970s.  
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